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FOOTNOTES

1 This phrase comes from the title of Francis Fukuyama "The End of History" The National Interest 1989. Volume 16:3-18.

2 Although some might consider the world to be becoming unipolar, non-American states might beg to differ.

3 Here, the term Security State is used as opposed to other modes of articulating the state in order to discuss those aspects of the state that are constituted in relation to issues of the integrity of the boundaries of the state. In other words this is the aspect of the state with which the military forces have been traditionally concerned.

This thesis uses three terms to refer to the state:

i. the state - this refers to the sovereign state as articulated in international law.

ii. the security state - as defined above

iii. the strategic arms community - those policymakers and their analysts who articulate the security state through their policies and long term strategic goals. Those who are professionally concerned with the territorial integrity of the state.

In short, the strategic arms community are those who are narrowly concerned with the security aspects of the state - the security state. This in turn, represents a subset of the sovereign state as a whole.

4 US Government, House Committee on Armed Services. Review of Arms control and Disarmament Activities 98th Congress Report. Special Panel on Arms Control and Disarmament of the Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 1985. p.5

5 Proponents of this view include Spinoza and Hobbes.

6 Waltz, Kenneth. Man, the State and War. New York, London: Columbia University Press, 1965. p.178.

7 Ibid.

8 While there are clear ontological differences between biological individuals and states, I am dealing here with the cultural individual which is socially produced through communicative acts within a cultural framework. In this sense, states and individuals may both be considered in terms of 'speaking subjects' rather than as biological entities.

9 Identity: the self or the state construed in cultural terms by invoking the self or the state.

Other: that which is not 'self' or 'core'. One may be accorded the status of Other by marginalisation - relegated to the 'periphery'.

Boundaries - that notional space that divides self from Other. In the case of states these are the borders of the sovereign state plus the boundaries of its operation. Boundaries are defined by the speech acts of the self (on both sides) toward the other. By identifying the other, the self is defined and even bounded and given meaning as a term.

10 Dening, Greg. History's Anthropology: The Death of William Gooch. ASAO Special Publications. Ed. Ivan Brady. Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America, Association for Social Anthropology in Oceania, 1988. p.1.

11 By posing the Other as threat the boundary making is made 'louder'/stronger. By building actual solid weapon systems in response to the perceived threat then the weapons form solid tokens that stand for and symbolise the threat posed by the other. The discourse of danger is mobilised by those whose job is to professionally police the boundaries between self and other in the name of the state.

12 By 'political environment' is meant the millieu comprising the Cold War, the domestic political community and the politics of the international arms control community.

13 By Event is meant: a meaningful act; a topic for discussion. Thus the building of the Krasnoyarsk radar was a material event (something that happened) which generated narratives interpreting the act as a meaningful violation event. In this sense the radar was, in addition to its radar function, also therefore, a 'sculpture' - a meaning-laden artefact.

14 See Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1970.

15 See Anatol Rappaport (ed.) Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company. 1974.

16 See Deborah Welch Larson Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985.

17 See G. Duffy Compliance and the Future of Arms Control Stanford University/Global Outlook, 1988, p.165

18 Space or domain, see: Julia Kristeva Desire in Language Tavistock: 1984

19 Newhouse, John. Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT. New York: Holt Reinhart and Winston, 1973.p.138.

20 Source: study presented by Ambassador Buchheim (U.S. Commissioner to the SCC) to the Select Committee on Intelligence when he testified on SALT I compliance on July 18, 1979, cited as Appendix to Briefing on SALT I Compliance Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1st Session, 96th Congress, September 25, 1979. Hereafter, the Appendix will be cited as Appendix to Briefing on SALT I Compliance while the Briefing shall be cited as Briefing on SALT I Compliance.

21 Ibid, p.43

1 Source: ABM TREATY "TREATY ON ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS, 26 MAY 1972"

Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 26,JUNE 1972 pp 918-920 quoted in R. Labrie (ed) SALT HANDBOOK: Key documents and issues 1972-1979 Washington DC: AEI Studies (1980)

Article XIII describes the functions of the SCC as follows:

1- To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2- The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

23 Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Arms, 26,May 1972 Article VI.

24 "Agreed Interpretations and Unilateral Statements" Interim Agreement, Paragraph [K] in Labrie, ed. (1980/26). The procedures were declassified in early 1993 (see Appendix G)

25 In his Statement, Ambassador Smith said: "The United States proposes that the sides agree that with regard to initial implementation of the ABM Treaty's Article XIII on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms and the Accidents Agreement*, agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is not in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels"

Minister Semenov replied that, on an ad referendum basis, he could agree that the U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding .

*Footnote in the original of Ambassador Smith's Statement read: See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed September 30, 1971.

26 Smith, Gerard. Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. New York: Doubleday, 1980.p.36.

27 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission; TIAS 7545 (December 21, 1972). The Memorandum states:

1- The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby establish a Standing Consultative Commission.

2- The Standing Consultative Commission shall promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty between the US and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, the Interim Agreement between the USA and the USSR on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of May26, 1972, and the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the US and the USSR of September 30, 1971, and shall exercise its competence in accordance with the provisions of Article XIII of said Treaty, Article VI of said Interim Agreement, and Article 7 of said Agreement on Measures.

3- Each Government shall be represented on the Standing Consultative Commission by a Commissioner, and a Deputy Commissioner, assisted by such staff as it deems necessary.

4- The Standing Consultative Commission shall hold periodic sessions on dates mutually agreed by the Commissioners but no less than two times per year. Sessions shall also be convened as soon as possible, following reasonable notice, at the request of either Commissioner.

5- The Standing Consultative Commission shall establish and approve Regulations governing procedures and other relevant matters and may amend them as it deems appropriate.

6- The Standing Consultative Commission will meet in Geneva. It may also meet at such other places as may be agreed.

Signed this December 21, 1972

28 Dan Caldwell notes that the "Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation: Memorandum of Understanding", not only 'officially created' the SCC, but also called for its responsibilities to be extended to cover the 'promotion of the objectives and implementation of' the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Sept.30,1971). See D. Caldwell in W.C. Potter Verification and Arms Control Mass:Lexington Books (1985/218)

29 U.S. Congress: Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, June 19,1972. In Labrie (ed) Op Cit 1980 p.78.

30 Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations 29, May 1972 in Labrie, Op Cit p.52

See Kissinger's tenth principle: "The USA and the USSR will seek to ensure that their ties and cooperation in all of the above-mentioned fields and in any others in their mutual interests are built on a firm and long-term basis. To give a permanent character to these efforts, they will establish in all fields where this is feasible joint commissions or other joint bodies..." [emphasis mine]

31 G. Duffy Compliance and the Future of Arms Control Stanford University/Global Outlook, 1988/165

32 Gerard C. Smith, U.S. Congress: Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, June 19,1972. In Labrie (ed) Op Cit. 1980 p.78.

33 The Memorandum of Understanding provides that the Commission would meet at least twice a year in Geneva.

34 See D. Caldwell in Potter,W.C. Op Cit p.219

35 Briefing on SALT I Compliance Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1st Session, 96th Congress, September 25, 1979. p.21

36 W. F. Rowell Arms Control Verification: A guide to policy issues for the 1980s Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1986/126

37 Source: Transcript of Author's interview with Dr. Alexei Arbartov, Department of Disarmament and Security Affairs, Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, at the ANU, Canberra 31/7/91. NB: On Friday 11/10/91 the State Council of the Soviet Union agreed to divide the Committee on State Security (KGB) in order to make the organisation more accountable to the Republics. Several new agencies are to be established and although it remains unclear as to the name of the agency that will take over the KGB's function within the SCC structure, it seems most likely to be the as-yet unnamed independent foreign espionage organisation. Source: International Herald Tribune 12-13 October, 1991, p.1.

38 See Ambassador Gerard C. Smith.

39 Duffy, Op Cit 1988/165

40 See Note 1.

41 Pursuant to Article XIV, sub-paragraph 2, of the ABM Treaty which states:

"Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty."

Although, not specifying the SCC to undertake this responsibility, the Article does permit the SCC to do so.

42 See D. Caldwell, in Potter,W.C. Op Cit. p.222-223.

43 See: Report of Secretary of State William Rogers to President Nixon on the SALT I Agreements, 10 June 1972. Department of State Bulletin 3, July, 1972 pp.3-11. Labrie (Op Cit ) notes that Secretary Rogers' report was submitted to the Senate and House of Representatives, with the texts of the ABM treaty and the Interim Report, on 13 June 1972.

(In Labrie,Op Cit p.60) Article XIII provides that the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission (hereafter referred to as the Commission) to promote the objectives and to facilitate the implementation of the ABM Treaty. The Parties have further agreed to use the Commission to promote the objectives and implementation of the Interim Agreement. (See Article VI of the Interim Agreement.) The Commission will provide a consulting framework within which the Parties may consider various matters relating to the Treaty and the Interim Agreement. The Parties may also consider these matters in other channels.

A principal function of the Commission will be to consider questions of compliance with the obligations assumed under this Treaty and the Interim Agreement and also related situations which may be considered ambiguous. Each Party may voluntarily provide through the Commission information it considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance based on information gathered by national technical means of verification and the other Party could provide information to clarify the matter.

Attention was called above to the provisions in Article XII prohibiting intentional interference with national technical means of verification operating in accordance with its provisions. The Commission is charged by Article XIII with the responsibility to consider any questions of interference with such means. The Commission may also consider questions of concealment impeding verification by national means. The Commission may also consider changes in the general strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of the Treaty. Related to this is the Commission's authority to consider proposals to further increase the viability of the Treaty-such as agreed interpretations after the Treaty has entered into force-and to consider proposals for amendment of the Treaty. (Amendments to the Treaty would have to be ratified pursuant to Articles XIV and XVI.) The Commission may also consider other appropriate measures, not specifically enumerated in Article XIII, aimed at further limiting strategic arms. Finally, through the Commission the Parties are to agree on procedures and dates for the implementation of Article VIII concerning destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or ABM components....

The second paragraph of Article XIII provides for the establishment of regulations for the Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters. Such matters can be worked out early in the follow-on negotiations. Meanwhile, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the Delegations during such negotiations or, when they are not in session, through other diplomatic channels.

The Commission is intended as a means to facilitate the implementation of the agreements and would not replace follow-on negotiations or use of other diplomatic channels.

44 Rowell 127

45 Ibid 127

46 Ibid 127

47 Ambiguous behaviours: activities that may indicate moves towards a treaty violation. Activities that may not, in and of themselves, be direct treaty violations but which may establish the preconditions for future violating activitiy.

48 Ambassador Smith in the 'Initialed Statements' comments: (Labrie,1980/36)

We are going to set up a Joint Consultative Commission which will in effect, act as a a surveying agent that will watch over the operation of the agreement, to which ambiguous situations can be referred, which will be a forum for further discussion of the possible amendments to see how the treaty is working, and to make sure that it stays viable over the years.

49 Buchheim, R.W. & D. Caldwell. The US-USSR SCC: Description and Appraisal. Working Paper. Providence, Rhode Island: The Centre for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, 1983.

50 Humphrey, Senator Gordon J. "Analysis and Compliance Enforcement in SALT Verification." International Security Review. 5.1 (1980): 1-26. p.5

51 R.W. Buchheim, Briefing on SALT I Compliance 1979, p.5 see note1.

52 Ibid p.2,

53 Standing Consultative Commission Regulations, T.I.A.S. 7637 (May 30 1973) Source: Calvo-Goller & Calvo (1987/301)

1 - The Standing Consultative Commission, established by the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972, shall consist of a U.S. component and Soviet component, each of which shall be headed by a Commissioner.

2 - The Commissioners shall alternately preside over the meetings.

3 - The Commissioners shall, when possible, inform each other in advance of the matters to be submitted for discussion, but may at a meeting submit for discussion any matter within the competence of the Commission.

4 - During the intervals between session of the Commission, each Commissioner may transmit written or oral communications to the other Commissioner concerning matters within the competence of the Commission.

5 - Each component of the Commission may invite such advisers and experts as it deems necessary to participate in a meeting.

6 - The Commission may establish working groups to consider and prepare specific matters.

7 - The results of the discussion of questions at the meetings of the Commission may, if necessary, be entered into records which shall be in two copies, each in the English and the Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

8 - The proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission shall be conducted in private. The Standing Consultative Commission may not make its proceedings public except with the express consent of both Commissioners.

9 - Each component of the Commission shall bear the expenses connected with its participation in the Commission.

54 TIAS 7637:1974. pp.1124-8.

55 R.W. Buchheim, U.S. Commissioner to the SCC: Briefing on SALT I Compliance, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Congress, 1st Session, September 25 1979:43-5 (declassified November 7, 1979)

56 Here, the term discourse refers to the U.S. 'frame of reference'. The term is invoked to illustrate the fluid and negotiated nature of discursivity as opposed to the rigidity implied by the term 'frame'.

57 From dialogic, a term coined by Volosinov (1973) in order to stress the continuous and interactive process of language, as opposed to the Saussurian emphasis on the abstract structural relations of language. Volosinov suggests that all language is expressive of social relations, and therefore he sees each individual utterance as structured as a dialogue with a notional addressee. This, he argues is a feature of all expressive acts, not merely linguistic ones, but any act of signification. In this sense, Buchheim recognises the need to address the publicity requirements of an open democracy, while maintaining the need for secrecy to preserve the functioning of sensitive negotiations and the liminal bounds of American self/other relations. See Volosinov, V. Marxism and the philosophy of Language N.Y.:Seminar Press, 1973.

58 Ibid p.3

59 Sydney Graybeal's statement reads in part: [d]uring the negotiation of that very controversial paragraph in the regulations, it was made clear that neither Commissioner has a veto power over the U.S. Government in the event that the U.S. Government decides that it is in its interest to make the results, the activities, or even the proceedings of the SCC available.

Source: Briefing on SALT I Compliance Op Cit, p.10

60 Ibid p.11

61 Ibid p.11 This issue will be raised in a later chapter.

62 By this, he refers to the use of strident accusations of non-compliance over ambiguous compliance behaviour that required clarification. Arbatov, Alexei. Department of Disarmament and Security Affairs, Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Research Interview on the SALT SCC. Taped at Australian National University, Canberra, 31/7/1991.

63 Source: Author's interview with Alexei Arbartov at the ANU, Canberra 31/7/91 [transcript of tape].

64 Ibid

65 Ibid

66 1975 and 1986. Source: U.S. State Department A Concise history of the Standing Consultative Commission (Wash. August 6,1984). These were, respectively, SCC special session convened by the U.S. to discuss Soviet SS19 in relation to the SALT I provision for 'heavy' missiles (January 28-February13,1975) and SCC special session convened by the Soviet Union to discuss U.S. decision to repudiate SALT II (July 22-29, 1986).

67 Ibid p.8

68 See supra note 7

69 R.W. Buchheim, Briefing on SALT I Compliance 1979 p.8

70 Sydney Graybeal and Michael Krepon "Making Better Use of the Standing Consultative Commission" in International Security 1986/1 p.185

71 Sydney Graybeal 'Statement of Hon. Sydney N. Graybeal, Former U.S. Commissioner to the Standing Consultative Commission, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency', in Buchheim, Briefing on SALT I Compliance, 1979,p.29

72 Bureau of Public Affairs U.S. Dept. of State Compliance With SALT I Agreements Special Report no.55 Washington: Dept of State July 1979 p.1, and see also SALT I Compliance: SALT II Verification, Department of State Selected Documents No. 7, Bureau of Public Affairs Office of Communication p.45

73 Ibid. p.1

74 Buchheim, R. Briefing on SALT I Compliance 1979 p.29

75 Ibid., p.29

76 Ambassador Buchheim supported these observations in Buchheim, Briefing on SALT I Compliance, p.30

77 Ibid., p.30

78 Here the term discursive is used in the sense of the 'right to speak' denoting, not merely the ability to speak, but a relation of power, such that, in this instance, that which is rendered as a 'speech act' (Austin:1964,Searle:1978) by either party carries equal weight.

79 Sydney Graybeal "Soviet Negotiating Practice" in L. Sloss & M. Scott Davis (eds.) A Game for High Stakes: Lessons Learned in Negotiating with the Soviets Mass.:Ballinger 1986:37.

80 Morton Kaplan "SALT and the International System" in Morton Kaplan (ed.) SALT: Problems and Prospects Morristown: General Learning Press, 1973, pp.1-25 p.13.

81 Arbatov, Alexei. Department of Disarmament and Security Affairs, Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Author's Research Interview on the SALT SCC. Taped at Australian National University, Canberra, 31/7/91, 1991.

82 Symbolic operation: That is to say, that arms control plays a role at the level of speech act as a culturally significant (meaningful) practice.

83 Lowenthal, Mark M. and Joel S. Wit "The Politics of Verification." Verification and Arms Control. Ed. William C. Potter. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1985. 153-168. p.163

84 Hedley Bull "Strategic Arms Limitation: the Precedent of the Washington and London Naval Treaties" in Morton Kaplan (ed.) Op Cit. in note 50, pp.26-52. p.50

85 Here, Bull is suggesting that SALT can be more than the mere limitation of arms - it can also become a forum for greater transparency at the level of strategic doctrine.

86 Ibid. p.50

87 See above.

88 Smith, Gerard. Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. New York: Doubleday, 1980.

89 Ibid. p.463

90 Strobe Talbot Deadly Gambits The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control New York:Alfred A. Knopf 1984,p228

91 Talbot Op Cit. 1984 p.228

92 Duffy Op Cit., 165

93 See: Arbatov, Alexei. Department of Disarmament and Security Affairs, Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Author's Research Interview on the SALT SCC. Taped at Australian National University, Canberra, 31/7/1991. and Buchheim, D. Caldwell & R.W. The US-USSR SCC: Description and Appraisal. Working Paper. Providence, Rhode Island: The Centre for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, 1983.

94 Buchheim, R.W. & D. Caldwell The US-USSR SCC: Description and Appraisal. Working Paper. Providence, Rhode Island: The Centre for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, 1983. p.14.

95Ibid p.165.

96 here used in the sense of 'the social process of making and reproducing sense' between political (read 'nation-state') subjectivities. See O'Sullivan, Saunders, Hartley and Fiske 1983:73 for an elaboration of this use of the term.

97 See Katz, Amrom. "Technical Collection in the 1980s." Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Clandestine Collection. Ed. Roy Godson. New Brunswick: National Strategy Information Center Inc, 1982. p.111 where he notes: "Deficiencies in the collection tools (or in the analysis) will continue. We know precious little about how "to do" cultural anthropology ..."

98 Michel Foucault The History of Sexuality: an introduction Harmondsworth:Penguin Books 1984/69

99 Robert Young Untying the Text: A Poststructuralist Reader. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981. p.3

100 Carl von Clausewitz On War Harmondsworth:Penguin Classics 1987/402

101 Syntagm: Saussurian linguistics argues that all languages and codes are built upon the two dimensions of paradigm and syntagm. While a paradigm is a set of units from which one may be chosen to combine with units from other paradigms, to form a syntagm, a syntagm represents the combination of paradigmatic units into a signifying whole. A sentence is an example of a syntagm, in which a word represents a paradigmatic unit. An advertisement is a syntagm of signs, a melody is a syntagm of notes, arms control treaties are therefore arguably a syntagm of treaty-limited items and their elements. O'Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders and Fiske, argue that in a syntagm the meaning of a unit is determined by how it interacts with the others, whereas in a paradigm it is determined by how it is distinguished from the others. For further reading see O'Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders and Fiske Key Concepts in Communication London:Methuen1983/166,237 and Ferdinand de Saussure Course in General Linguistics NewYork: McGraw-Hill 1966 Section 2.

102 Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus London:Routledge 1988/5-8 aphorisms 1.1-2.034.

103 Ibid p.8 aphorism 2.05

104 Coral Bell The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger Era London:Martin Robertson 1977/56

105 Ibid p.56

106 Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics" Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol 1, 1957, pp309-328 at p.328 quoted in R.F. Hopkins and R.W. Mansbach Structure and Process in International Politics New York: Harper and Row 1973/159 [emphasis mine]

107 See C.von Clausewitz Op cit. p.402

108 that is to say along one axis it tends towards, but never achieves a 1:1 relation to reality (mimesis) and along the other, it tends towards but never achieves pure fantasy (figuration).

109 Mimesis: literally 'imitation'. For Aristotle, the use of language meant to mirror, or imitate a pre-existent world. See Aristotle. Poetics. Michigan: Ann Arbor/University of Michigan Press, 1973.p.3. For Plato the term was perjorative, holding that since natural objects were themselves mere appearances of the real, then writing or painting were imitations of imitations.

110 Ole Wæver "Tradition and Transgression in International Relations: a Post-Ashleyan Position" Arbejdspapirer Working Papers Copenhagen:Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1989 p.37

111 Ibid p.37

112 Coral Bell "Communication between Powers" Crisis and Hierarchy unpublished manuscript, Canberra:ANU 1991/52

113 Robert JervisThe Logic of Images in International Relations Princeton: Princeton University Press.1970

114 Herbert Blumer, "Society as Symbolic Interaction," Human Behaviour and Social Processes, Ed. Arnold Rose, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962 quoted in R. Jervis, 1970/4

115 Coral Bell, Op Cit.

116 Young, Robert. Untying the Text: A Poststructuralist Reader. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981.pp.3-4.

117 See Mikhail Bakhtin The Dialogic Imagination 1981

118 Young, Robert. Untying the Text: A Poststructuralist Reader. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981.p.8

119 See section 3.2 Strategic Background: From 'gap' to parity in this chapter.

120 Here I stay with M.H. Abrams' 1981:170-172 definition of semiotics as: "a science of signs" according to which "not only explicit systems of communication such as language, morse code, traffic signs and signals, are constituted by signs" but also "a great diversity of human actions and productions-our bodily postures and gestures, the social rituals we perform ... -all convey shared "meanings" to members of a particular culture, and so can be analysed as signs which function in diverse kinds of signifying systems..." [emphasis mine]

121 See Bradley S. Klein Strategic Discourse and its Alternatives NY:Center on Violence and Human Survival Working Papers 1987/1

122 George H. Quester The Continuing Problem of International Relations NY:Dryden Press 1974/48

123 See Alan Ryan The Philosophy of the Social Sciences London:Macmillan 1980

124 Ibid. pp. 130-131

125 Ryan: see note 6 above.

126 There are a range of works outlining these perceptions, including Abernathy, M.G., Hill, D., & Williams, P. eds The Carter Years: The President and Policy Making London:Frances Pinter, 1984, Coral Bell President Carter and Foreign Policy: The Costs of Virtue? Canberra:ANU, 1980, Haregrove, E. Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership & the Politics of the Public Good Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ., 1988, Jerel A. Rosati The Carter Administration's quest for Global Community Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina, 1987, Donald S. Spencer The Carter Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur Style of Diplomacy
NY:Præger 1988, and others. For a contrary view see A.D. Campbell Security and Identity Canberra:ANU Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis 1990.

127 The Self/Other distinction is explained in footnote 8 on p.9

128 See Acheson, D. Present at the Creation NY:American Library, 1970 p.155

129 See Greville Rumble The Politics of Nuclear Defence Cambridge:Polity Press, 1985 p.9.

130 Ibid p.11

131 Established April 1957 under Mr. H. Rowan Gaither.

132 For more on this see Dwight D. Eisenhower The White House Years London:Heinemann 1966, p220.

133 Ibid. p.221

134 Ibid. p.222

135 Perception: That view of the Other salient to the actions of Self vis-a-vis the Other. Perceptions are based on plausible claims by or about the other. Where perceptions are held by state decisionmakers, this can lead to reactive behaviour which can be directed outward or inward or offensive/non--offensive. In this instance the resultant behaviour was to develop greater attentiveness through the early warning radar technologies.

136 See Greville Rumble, 1985, Op.Cit. in note 5, p.12

137 Here I use the term discourse to denote "the inscription of a particular knowledge" - see Catherine Belsey's review of Lynda Nead Myths of Sexuality: Representations of Women in Victorian Britain in History of the Human Sciences Vol. 3, No. 1, 1990, pp. 149-151.

138 To limit the potential to develop offensive artillery, the Treaty of Versailles placed a 100mm calibre limit on artillery barrels. Rockets, by definition do not have a 'calibre' and were therefore outside of the regime of treaty-limited items.

139 Tested in 1959 and 1960 respectively.

140 Greville Rumble Op Cit. in note 5, p.12

141 see M.T. Gallagher and K.F. Spielmann, Soviet Decision Making for Defence NY:1972 p.5 quoted in Michael J. Sheehan Arms Control Theory and Practice Oxford: Blackwell 1988 p.46.

142 That is, problems of perception, rather than actuality - hence it is a language-based symbolic-order problem.

143 Michael J. Sheehan Op Cit 1988 p.46

144 Sergei Korolev, among others had developed liquid-fuelled rockets for atmospheric research in the 1930s.

145 Greville Rumble Op. Cit. 1985 p.15 puts this at a 4:1 Soviet lead.

146 Burrows, William. Deep Black: The Secrets of Space Espionage. London: Bantam Books, 1988.p.110

147 Ibid. p.111

148 Ibid. p.111

149 See Dan Caldwell "Verification and SALT" in William C. Potter Verification and SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception Boulder:Westview Press 1980 p.229

150 See William E. Burrows Deep Black London:Bantam 1988 p.91 Burrows notes that resolution was said to have ranged from 20 feet to about 5 as the program advanced (p.92).

151 Dwight D. Eisenhower Op Cit. in note 8, p.390

152 Ibid p.390

153 Supra note 11 - this is not to underestimate the discursive realm in the constitution of realities.

154 Ibid n.1 p.547

155 See Michael Sheehan Arms Control: Theory and Practice Oxford:Blackwell, 1988 p.45

156 Greville Rumble 1985 Op.Cit. in note 5 p.16

157 Discursive economies of threat: that which is set in play by invoking the idea of danger, placing into circulation a chain of acts in reaction to the notional danger.

158 Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith How Much is Enough? NY:Harper and Row, 1971 p.208, where they point out:

... the main reason for stopping at 1000 Minuteman missiles, 41 Polaris submarines and some 500 strategic bombers is that having more would not be worth the additional cost. These force levels are sufficiently high to put the United States on the "flat of the curve" -that is, at a point where small increases in target destruction capability would require enormous increases in forces, and therefore in cost. The answer to the question of how many strategic offensive forces are enough rests heavily on such flat of the curve reasoning.

159 Qualitative change: that is, the results of research and development leading to extensions to

i. performance factors (improvements leading to a new capability, or to an extension of the performance envelope)

ii. quality design factors (improvements to the reliability or maintainability of existing capabilitites) or

iii. force multipliers (developments external to the specific weapon system, but which enhance its capability).

160 John Newhouse The Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT NY:Holt Reinehart and Winston 1973, p.20.

161 See Greville Rumble, Op Cit in note 5 p.17

162 Paul C. Warnke in the Forward to N. K. Calvo-Goller and M. A. Calvo The SALT Agreements: Content-Application-Verification Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff 1987/x.

163 John Newhouse Op. Cit, in note 52, p.21.

164 Ibid. p.21.

165 Greville Rumble (1985) Op Cit in note 5 p.18

166 US ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations Washington: ACDA 1980 p132.

167 H. KissingerThe White House Years Sydney:Hodder & Stoughton, 1979/535

168 Ibid. p.536

169 Ibid p.536

170 Ibid

171 Michael Sheehan Op Cit in note 41 p.58

172 The boost phase lasts from launch to burnout of the final stage. Lasting from 3-5 minutes, the hot gases exhausting from a missile booster motor emit hundreds of kilowatts at short and medium wave infra-red (SWIR and MWIR) wavelengths. This radiation plume can be detected by sensors at great distances.

173 In the post-boost and midcourse phases surveillance (target acquisition) becomes considerably more difficult. At these phases, the post-boost vehicles cool to around room temperature, emitting long-wave infrared radiation (LWIR). It is possible for this radiation to be detected by sensors, super-cooled (near absolute zero) to prevent their own radiation from swamping the signal. It is technically difficult to put such sensors in space because they require long-lived low-power cryogenic refrigerators capable of keeping them at their operating temperature. Source: Office of Technology Assessment report "Ballistic Missile Defence Technologies" in OTA Strategic Defences Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1986.p.160.

174 The terminal phase represents the final (reentry) phase of a ballistic missile's trajectory, during which the reentry vehicles enter the atmosphere and detonate at their target. This phase lasts for about 1 minute or less. Detection and tracking systems that could be used for terminal phase ABM target acquisition include ground-based Large Phased Array Radars (LPARs) and airborne optical and infrared (LWIR) detectors. As of 1986 LWIR technology is not as far advanced as that for shorter wavelengths. Source: OTA Report Strategic Defenses Op Cit. in note 68.

175 Michael Sheehan Op Cit in note 41 p. 536.

176 The Washington Post August 17, 1970, quoted in Kissinger (1979) Op Cit in note 40, p.537

177 Kissinger (1979) Op Cit in note 29, p.538

178 Michael Sheehan (1988) Op Cit in note 24 p.58

179 Ibid p.60

180 See for example Coral Bell President Carter and Foreign Policy: The Costs of Virtue? Canberra:ANU Canberra Studies in World Affairs No.1, 1980/15

181 G. Duffy Compliance and the Future of Arms Control Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988 p.4

182 Ibid p.4 square parenthetic additions mine.

183 Ian Bellany How Much Verification? Unpublished manuscript (1990) and author's interview at the University of Lancaster May 1990.

184 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research The Verification Issue in United Nations Disarmament Negotiations NY: UNIDIR 1987/1.

185 Bellany also emphasised this point. Ian Bellany: author's interview at the University of Lancaster May 1990

186 Testimony of Sydney Graybeal in R.W. Buchheim Briefing on SALT I Compliance Washington: US Senate Foreign Relations Committee 1979, p.13

187 Ibid

188 not necessarily particularly significant by itself, but when read alongside a range of other 'barometric' indicators, this aspect could lend important evidence to assist the analyst's reading of the perception of bilateral confidence in the intentions of the Other to comply with the terms of an agreement.

189 Richard Nixon's instructions to the SALT I negotiating team quoted in Michael Krepon Arms Control: Verification and Compliance NY: 1984 p.38.

190 Agreement on Basic Principles of Negotiations on Strategic Arms Limitation, 21 June 1973 signed by Nixon and Brezhnev Article 4 states: "Limitations on Strategic offensive arms must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means." [emphasis mine]

191 See for example R.W. Buchheim Briefing on SALT I Compliance Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate, 96th Congress, 1st Session, September 25, 1979 (declassified November 7, 1979).

192 "Statement of Sydney N. Graybeal, Former US Commissioner to the Standing Consultative Commission, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency" in R.W. Buchheim 1979 Op Cit in note 59, p.16.

193 Cited in The Congressional Record Proceedings and Debates of the 95th Congress, 2nd Session August 17 1978 p.26691.

194 Ibid

195 Cited in The Baltimore Sun February 25 1978 p.1 as quoted in The Congressional Record 95th Cong. 2nd Session August 17 p.26691.

196 Les Aspin and Fred M. Kaplan "Verification in Perspective" in W.C. Potter (ed.)Verification and SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception Boulder: Westview 1980/177.

197 Paul C. Warnke "Executive Branch Report on Verification of the Proposed SALT TWO Agreement" Received in classified form on February 28, 1978 and sanitised and released February 23,1978 referred to in, and published with, US Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Briefings on the SALT Negotiations. Washington: US Congress, Thursday November 3 1977 pp.14-16 at p.14.

198Ibid. p.15

199 Ibid. [Emphasis mine].

200 Ibid.

201 Ibid.

202 See ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agreement: Texts and Histories of Negotiations Washington:ACDA, 1980, p.135.

203 Protocol to the ABM Treaty, July 3, 1974.

204 ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations Washington:ACDA 1980/148

205 J.L George makes the point that SALT I was deliberately an interim agreement in order to foster ongoing negotiations as provided by Article VII of the Interim Agreement. See J.L. George The New Nuclear Rules: Strategy and Arms Control After INF and START. London:Pinter 1990/87.

206 US ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and histories of negotiation. Washington:ACDA 1980/202

207 Source: Adapted from Greville Rumble The Politics of Nuclear Defence: A Comprehensive Introduction Oxford:Polity 1985/21.

208 These have already laid out in more detail in Chapter 2.

209 See "TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS JUNE 18, 1978" in ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations Washington:ACDA 180/207-230.

210 US ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations Washington:US ACDA 1980/205

211 Ibid p.227

212 Testimony of Dr William Perry, Under Secretary of Defence in SALT II Treaty Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington:USGPO July 16 1979/251

213 Ibid p.252-3

214 Testimony of Sydney Graybeal in R.W. Buchheim Briefing on SALT I Compliance 1979 p.16

215 Author's interview with Alexei Arbatov, Canberra:ANU, 31/7/91.

216 See Chapter 2 of this thesis.

217 Source: Author's interview with Alexei Arbatov, Canberra:ANU, 31/7/91.

218 Subjectivities: In the context of discourse theory the term represents all that can be signified by a collision/collusion, even conflation of three established senses, described by O'Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders and Fiske (1983:231) in terms of i) Subject of political theory: the citizen as subject of the state, implying the positioning of the subject within networks of power relations, ii) Subject of Idealist philosophy: a site of consciousness implying a division between subject and object, between thought and reality, between self and other (an opposition critiqued by Heidegger and Derrida). In this sense, subjectivity has been traditionally represented as a unitary identity which appears as the source of action and meaning rather than as their product. The individualism of this position fails to account for the role of language and social relations in determining, regulating or producing what any thinking subject can be. iii) The subject of grammar: that which the action is about or determined by.

My use of the term subjectivities (or subjects) refers to that identity which emerges as a symptom of the articulation of the difference (or différance [J. Derrida]) between 'self' and 'other' - that product of boundary-making practices which marks a position - upon which further action may be based. The identity so construed is thus historically contingent (insofar as it emerges as a product of historical forces) and socially situated by and through language [or signifying system] (in which naming practices play a significant role).

219 US Secretary of State to the President June 10, 1972.

220 US DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NO.55: COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I AGREEMENTS HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 25/9/79]

221 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 17/8/78 26693

222 Arbatov, Alexei. Department of Disarmament and Security Affairs, Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Author's personal Interview on the SALT SCC. Taped at Australian National University, Canberra, 31/7/91. and Buchheim, D. Caldwell & R.W. The US-USSR SCC: Description and Appraisal. Providence, Rhode Island: The Centre for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, 1983.

223 This refers to testing at altitudes in excess of 30,000 metres.

224 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 17/8/78 26693

225 US DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NO.55: COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I AGREEMENTS HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 25/9/79

226 (Congressional Record p. 4964).

227 This understanding languished in the SCC from 1982 until 1985 because of interagency disputes in the United States over the appropriate US approach to the SCC. Finally, at the spring 1985 SCC session, the United States and the Soviet Union signed this common understanding. In its December 1985 noncompliance report, the US administration classified this charge as based on evidence"insufficient fully to assess compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM treaty."

228 See US DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NO.55: COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I AGREEMENTS. HEARING BEFORE THE US SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 25/9/79

229 Congressional Record 17/8/78 p.26693

230 See: SALT ONE: Compliance / SALT TWO: Verification, U.S. Department of State Selected Documents No. 7, Bureau of Public Affairs Office of Communication p.47

231 Un-named article by Jack Anderson in The Washington Post September 21, 1979, cited in Briefing on SALT I Compliance HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 96th CONGRESS, 1st SESSION, SEPTEMBER 25,1979, DECLASSIFIED AND MADE PUBLIC NOVEMBER 7, 1979. p.22

232 Ibid.

233 According to Graybeal, the missile launchers were about 80% dismantled according to the procedures. Op Cit. p.24.

234 Ibid

235 US DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NO.55: COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I AGREEMENTS HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 25/9/79 p. 3

236 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 17/8/78 "PRINCIPAL ALLEGED SOVIET VIOLATIONS RELATING TO THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY" p.26691.

237 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE. 17/8/78. p. 26693

238 Briefing on SALT I Compliance HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 96th CONGRESS, 1st SESSION, SEPTEMBER 25,1979, DECLASSIFIED AND MADE PUBLIC NOVEMBER 7, 1979. p.26

239 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 17/8/78 26693

240 US DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NO.55: COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I AGREEMENTS HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 25/9/79 p. 4. Duffy, in Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.50, notes that the United States claimed that these shelters were designed to protect workers against the weather and to assist the curing of the concrete, while hardening bases in the Midwest areas that are subject to heavy winter snow.

241 Duffy Op Cit p.51

242 See Briefing on SALT I Compliance Op Cit.

243 US DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NO.55: COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I AGREEMENTS HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 25/9/79 p. 4.

244 Goldblat, Jozef, ed. Agreements for Arms Control: A Critical Survey. London: Taylor and Francis/SIPRI, 1982. p.208

245 The most notable of these being the article by Melvin Laird that appeared in the Reader's Digest

246 This system was an upgraded version of the Distance Early Warning (DEW) system of the late 1950s.

247 Sometimes refered to as the 'power-aperture product' - see Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988. pp.90-92. and Krass, A.Verification: How Much is Enough? Massachussetts: Lexington Books and SIPRI, 1985. pp.38-42.

248 Duffy Op Cit. p.91 cites the figure of ten-times the frequency at which early warning surveillance LPARS operate.

249 UNIDIR A Legal Approach to Verification in Disarmament or Arms Limitation NY: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 1988/3-4

250 UNIDIR in note 99 p.4

251 Phillip R. Trimble "Soviet Violations of Arms Control Agreements: A Legal Perspective" CISA Working Paper No 53 Los Angeles: Centre for International and Strategic Affairs 1985/2

252 Testimony of Senator Henry Jackson Soviet Compliance With Certain Provisions of the 1972 SALT I Agreements Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Arms Control 94th Cong. 1st Session March 6, 1975/2

253 See President Richard Nixon's Letter of Transmissal to Congress in transmitting the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement June 13, 1972 p.16:

"The United States has also made clear that it would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side, which is the SS-11, to be a heavy missile."

254 Schlesinger invokes a distinction between two types of ambiguity in compliance problems - those that are 'inherently ambiguous' and those that are 'deliberately ambiguous', in which the former are said to 'lend themselves to solutions over time' and the latter which arguably do not.

255 Testimony of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger Soviet Compliance With Certain Provisions of the 1972 SALT I Agreements Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Arms Control 94th Cong. 1st Session March 6, 1975/4

256 Testimony of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger Soviet Compliance With Certain Provisions of the 1972 SALT I Agreements Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Arms Control 94th Cong. 1st Session March 6, 1975/8

257 Testimony of James Schlesinger 94th Congress, 2nd session 1975 p.13.

258 See John Newhouse The Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT NY:Holt Reinehart and Winston 1973

259 Lowenthal, Mark M. and Wit, J.S. "The Politics of Verification." In Verification and Arms Control. Edited by W. C. Potter 1985, pp.153-168. Lexington: Lexington Books.p.153

260 Ibid

261 in other words, the profile of verification was raised from that of an instrumental assurance of compliance into that of a political device which prevented the conclusion of new arms control agreements.

262 Henry Kissinger Statement made at the White House, June 1972, quoted by Senator Henry Jackson in Testimony before the Arms Control Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Soviet Compliance With Certain Provisions of the 1972 SALT I Agreements Washington:94th Congress, 1st Sess., 6 March, 1975 p.18. [Emphasis mine].

263 Congressional Record August 17,1978 p.26691, Proceedings and Debates of the 95th Congress 2nd Session Vol.24 Part 20 Washington:Government Printing Office.

264 Graybeal in Buchheim Briefing on SALT I Compliance 1979. p.12 [Emphasis mine]

265 John G. Behuncik, Congressional Fellow for National Security Affairs at the Heritage Foundation, quoted in Congressional Record proceedings and Debates of the 95th Congress, US Senate, 2nd Session, Vol. 124, Part 20, August 17, 1978, p.26691.

266 Joseph Kruzel "From Rush-Bagot to START: The Lessons of Arms Control" in C.W. Kegley and E.R. Wittkopf The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives 2nd Ed. New York: Random House 1988 p.148

267 Ibid.

268 See for example US House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Full Committee Consideration of Overall National Security Programs and Related Budget Requirements 94th Congress, December 1975. p.131 Statement of John T. Hughes.

269 See for example US House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Full Committee Consideration of Overall National Security Programs and Related Budget Requirements 94th Congress, December 1975. p.140 Statement of Amos A. Jordan.

270 Ibid.

271 Ibid. p.144.

272 General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff United States Military Posture for FY 1978 Washington:US Congress January 1977 p.121.

273 Ibid. p.97

274 Testimony of James Schlesinger 94th Congress, 2nd session 1975 p.16 in the course of which, Senator McIntyre asked: "What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the Standing Consultative Commission in resolving ambiguities associated with Soviet non-compliance with SALT agreements?" Secretary Schlesinger replied "As of this moment, Senator McIntyre, we just must withhold judgement."

275 Melvin Laird "A Strong Start in a Difficult Decade: Defence Policy in the Nixon-Ford Years." International Security. Vol.10, No.2, Fall 1985, pp.5-26, at p.5.

276 Komer, Robert W. "What 'Decade of Neglect?'"International Security Vol.10, No.2, 1985.

pp. 70-83. p.74

277 US Senate. Armed Services Committee. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations FY1979 95th Congress, 2nd Session on S-2571, Part 1 - Authorization Posture Statement. Washington: US GPO Feb.7,1978 p.43

278 Bell, Coral. 1980. President Carter and Foreign Policy: The Costs of Virtue? Canberra Studies in World Affairs. Canberra: The Australian National University.p.1.

279 Other types of foreign policy 'failure' can, however be located in perceptions of Soviet adventurism in the Horn of Africa, in the loss of intelligence facilities in Iran , the Iran hostage crisis, and in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The point I make here is analytically restricted to military force structure as this has the most direct bearing on the issue of SALT, and US-SU compliance behaviours.

280 Graybeal in Buchheim Briefing on SALT I Compliance 1979/14

281 Ibid p.14.

282 Mark Lowenthal and Joel Wit "The Politics of Verification" in W.C. Potter(ed)Verification and Arms Control Lexington Mass.:Lexington Books 1985/pp.153-186 at p.185.

283 Michel Foucault History of Sexuality: An Introduction Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1985/86

284 SIPRI Strategic Disarmament Verification and National Security London: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1977/29

285 Brodie, Bernard. The Absolute Weapon. New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1946. p.76

286 Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Penguin Classics. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1987.

287 See Dillon, G.M. "Modernity, Discourse and Deterrence." Current Issues in Peace Research. Ed. Pertti Joenniemi. Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1989.

288 See Dillon, G.M. & B. Klein Back to the Future: Rearticulating the NATO Alliance of Security and Identity. Washington: International Studies Association, 1990.

289 Foucault:Discipline and Punish Harmondsworth:Penguin Books 1977.p.27

290 That is to say, verification technologies and institutions are designed to collect specific kinds of data toward a specific end (to catch Treaty violators and to ensure compliance). Thus, coupled with the institutions of verifications they constitute a source and a domain of knowledge.

291 Coercion is not an abstract term - it is about coercion of someone. Thus technologies of coercion imply at least the potential to identify the one to be coerced. Insofar as the very existence of technologies of verification can deter cheating (by raising the risk of being caught) then one state is exerting power over another.

292 Ibid.

293 Barnet, Richard J. Real Security: Restoring American Power in a Dangerous Decade. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981. p.107

294 Source: Assembly of Western European Union, Document 1160, "Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite - reply to the thirty-third annual report of the council" 7th November 1988, p.9 quoted in "Verification in Conventional Arms Control" by Volker Kunzendorff Adelphi Papers 245 Winter 1989 p.53

295 Ibid. p.53

296 A. Krass Verification: How Much is Enough? Lexington/ SIPRI, 1985, p.46

297 From 1981 there seems to have been a pattern of KH11s being orbitted in pairs with a spacing of 46(o)-49(o). Sipri suggests that no such relationship appears to operate between KH11s and Big Bird satellites, the former operated by the CIA while the latter are operated by the US Air Force.

298 Source: Jasani, Bhupendra. "Military Use of Outer Space." The Arms Race and Arms Control: Facts and Figures on the Arms Race and Arms Control Efforts. Ed. SIPRI. London: Taylor and Francis Ltd, 1982. 97-115. pp.100-101.

299 Krass, Allan E. Verification: How Much is Enough? Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985.p.13.

300 This section shows that the intelligence community mediates the data on which verification of compliance is based. The section shows that despite the technology the data is often ambiguous and requires enhancement and interpretation within a community of people (who are themselves selected and trained through specific interpretive screens). Their product for the SCC is the information on which the SCC relies for judgement about whether to raise issues, and in what manner. For this reason it is relevant to the thesis. It is also an aspect of the 'gaze' - the generation of fields of knowledge that constitute the behaviour of the Other as a 'case.'

301 See Florini, Ann M. "The Opening Skies: Third Party Imaging Satellites and US National Security." Back to the Future: Lessons From Experience for Regional Arms Control Verification. Ed. Brian Mandell. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989.

302 Ann Florini in Mandell Op Cit. 1989. p.175

303 Burrows, William. Deep Black: The Secrets of Space Espionage. London: Bantam Books, 1988. p.113.

304 Hopple, G. & B. Watson, ed. The Military Intelligence Community. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1986. p.83

305 Ibid.

306 Ibid

307 Hulnick, Arthur S. "Relations Between Intelligence Producers and Policy Consumers: A New Way of Looking at an Old Problem." Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society. Ed. Stephen J. Cimbala. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Transnational Publishers Inc, 1987. p.135ff.

308 Ibid. p.136

309 Krass, A.Verification: How Much is Enough? Massachussetts: Lexington Books and SIPRI, 1985. p.8

310 See Krass, 1985 Chapter 2,

311 Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. "Intelligence, Deception and Surprise: Implications for United States Policy in the 1980s." Intelligence Policy and National Security. Ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr, Uri Ra'anan and Warren Milberg. Hamden Connecticut: Archon Books, 1981. 297-315.p.309.

312 For the debate on whether there is in fact an intelligence community see Thomas, Jack E. "The Intelligence Community." The Military Intelligence Community. Ed. Gerald W. Hopple and Bruce W. Watson. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986. 3-15. and Strong, J. Thompson. "The Defense Intelligence Community." The Military Intelligence Community. Ed. Gerald W. Hopple and Bruce W. Watson. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986. 15-39.

313 Krass, A.Verification: How Much is Enough? Massachussetts: Lexington Books and SIPRI, 1985. p.9.

314 Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. "Intelligence, Deception and Surprise: Implications for United States Policy in the 1980s." Intelligence Policy and National Security. Ed. Uri Ra'anan and Warren Milberg Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. Hamden Conn.: Archon Books, 1981. 297-315. p.308.

315 Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977.

316 See K. Enderby "The Political Uses of Nuclear Threat" in Australian Outlook April 1987, Vol. 41,#1 pp.22-29

317 W. Stützle, B. Jasani and R. Cowen Op Cit. 1987. p.208 [Emphasis mine]

318 See Manfred Efinger "The Verification Policy of the Soviet Union" in Aussenpolitik iv:1989. p.339

319 Invoking international norms Reagan made accusations outside of the legal arms control regime over behaviours that were at worst ambiguous and had not at the time been construed as violations. This period of 'beat up' was known by some as the 'compliance crisis.'

320 Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. Penguin Books,.Harmondsworth. 1977.p.184

321 See Krass, A. Verification: How Much is Enough? Massachussetts: Lexington Books and SIPRI, 1985.p.143

322 Ibid.

323 "Insights of an On-Site Inspector" Arms Control Today November 1988/6

324 Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977.p.184.

325 Ibid.

326 Ibid.

327 Dillon, G.M. and B. Klein "Back to the Future: Rearticulating the NATO Alliance of Security and Identity". Working Paper. Washington: International Studies Association, 1990.

328 OSI was discussed by the SALT II negotiating team during the Carter administration.

329 Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977. p.191

330 Source: Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, NASA Authorisation for Fiscal Year 1978 Hearings Before Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space and the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation (S.365) pp.1642-3 & 1647, and McDonnell Douglas Corp. Reconnaissance Hand Book 1982, p.125 quoted in Ann M. Florini "The Opening Skies: Third-Party Imaging Satellites and U.S. National Security" in Brian Mandell (ed) Back to The Future: Lessons from experience for regional arms control and verification Ottawa: Carleton University,1989/195.

331 Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977. p.192.

332 Walker, RBJ Contending Sovereignties Boulder: Lynne Reinner. 1990. p.163.

333 Todorov, Tzvetan. The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1987. p.3

334 Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Penguin Classics. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, (1834) 1987. p.402 [emphasis mine].

335 ...national security/identity: is predicated upon the integrity of the boundary between Self and Other. The boundary being a cultural construct, is argued to be inherently prone to dissolution and must therefore be constantly maintained - 'stated' - yet always subject to being 're-stated' by alternative voices within and between states. The war-like tension between boundary maintenance and boundary rearticulation leads to the reformulation of Clausewitz.

336 Cyrus Vance Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983 pp.31-32

337 Rosati, Jerel A. The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community. Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1987. p.39

338 See, for example General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff United States Military Posture for FY 1978 Washington:US Congress January 1977 p.1.

339 Ibid, p.53

340 Spencer, Donald S. The Carter Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur Style of Diplomacy. New York: Præger, 1988. p.117.

341 Frei, Daniel. Assumptions and Perceptions in Disarmament. New York: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1984. p.6.

342 Todorov, Tzvetan. The Conquest of America: The question of the other. New York: Harper & Row, 1984. p.3.

343 Katz, Amrom H. "The Fabric of Verification: The Warp and the Woof." Verification and SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception. Ed. William C. Potter. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980. 193-220. p.212.

344 Jervis, Robert. The Logic of Images in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.

345 Barnet, Richard J. Real Security: Restoring American Power in a Dangerous Decade. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981. p.22

346 Here I agree with Jim George (ANU, personal communication, 16/9/91), that the emergence of the CPD was symptomatic of the conservative forces that led to the rise of neo-realism in the 1980s.

347 There were 60 Members of the Board of Directors of the Committee on the Present Danger appointed to the Reagan administration, including Ronald Reagan himself. Five of these members were women, and of these, three were deployed in traditionally 'soft' policy areas as for example, Task Force on Food Assistance, National Commission on Social Security Reform, US Representative to the [then emasculated] United Nations. See Tyroller, Charles II, ed. Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger. Washington: Pergamon Brassey's, 1984. pp.ix-xi.

348 See: Lyotard, Jean-Francois. "The Differend, the Referent, and the Proper Name." Diacritics 14.3, Fall (1984): 4-14. And Lyotard, Jean-Francois. The Différend: Phrases in Dispute. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988. p.xi where he defines différend as follows: "As distinguished from a litigation, a differend [différend ] would be a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgement applicable to both arguments. One side's legitimacy does not imply the other side's lack of legitimacy. However, applying a single rule of judgement to both in order to settle their differend as though it were merely a litigation would wrong (at least) one of them."

349 He came to Washington in the Summer of 1940. Source: Nitze, Paul H., A. Smith, Steven Rearden. From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Centre of Decision - A Memoir. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989.p.ix

350 See: Herken, Gregg. Counsels of War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. p.274. The Committee on the Present Danger derived its name from a remark attributed to Oliver Wendell Holmes who held that no one had the right to shout "Fire!" in a crowded room unless there was a clear and present danger. The 1950 CPD had among its membership, in addition to Paul Nitze, James Bryant Conant, Tracy Voorhees, Robert Patterson and others. See Nitze, Paul H., A. Smith, Steven Rearden. From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Centre of Decision - A Memoir. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989. p.353.

351 Herken Op Cit. 1985, p.275

352 A 'hawk' from the beginning, this was Paul Nitze's own overestimation. See Barnet, 1981, p.57

353 Paul H. Nitze with A. Smith, Steven Rearden. From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Centre of Decision - A Memoir. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989. p. 351.

354 See: Wohlstetter, Albert. "Is there a Strategic Arms Race?" Foreign Policy. 15. Summer (1974), "Rivals, but No Race." Foreign Policy. 17. Fall (1974), "How to Confuse Ourselves." Foreign Policy. 20. Fall (1975).

355 The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Committee was a sixteen member body, of whom six were original members of the CPD. These included Edward Teller and John Foster. Source: Barnet, Richard J. Real Security: Restoring American Power in a Dangerous Decade. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981. p. 57.

356 According to Paul Nitze (1989 p.351) the Team B members were: Paul Nitze (CPD), Richard Pipes (Head of Team B, CPD), General Daniel O. Graham, (former Director of the Defence Intelligence Agency), Professor William R. Van Cleave (Defence expert, CPD), Paul Wolfowitz (ACDA), Thomas Wolfe (RAND) Seymour Weiss, and General John W. Vogt Jr. (Commander of US Forces in Europe, Ret.).

357 For the contrary view, laid out in some considerable detail on why, for specific technological reasons, the CIA was closer to the truth, see: MacKenzie, Donald. "The Soviet Union and Strategic Missile Guidance." International Security. (1988): 5-54. Especially p.52-3. And

McKenzie, Donald. Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance. Cambridge, Massachussetts: The MIT Press, 1990.

358 This is outlined in Scheer, Robert. With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War. New York: Random House, 1982. pp.53-65.

359 Herken, Gregg. Counsels of War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. p.278.

360 Herken 1985 p.278

361 Senator Daniel Moynihan, quoted in Herken, 1985 Op Cit. p.278.

362 That the Soviet intentions were to surpass the United States in strategic capability. Ibid.

363 Senator Daniel Moynihan, quoted in Herken, 1985 Op Cit. p.278.

364 March 12, 1976

365 Nitze, Paul H., A. Smith, Steven Rearden. From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Centre of Decision - A Memoir. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989. p.353. see also Newhouse, John. The Nuclear Age: From Hiroshima to Star Wars. London: Michael Joseph, 1989. p.295

366 Also present were: Paul Nitze, Henry H. Fowler, Charls E. Walker, Richard V. Allen, Lane Kirkland,Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, James R Schlesinger, David Packard, Charles Burton Marshall, Edmund A. Gullion and Charles Tyroler II. Source: Tyroler, Charles II, ed. Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger. Washington: Pergamon Brassey's, 1984. p.xv.

367 Some $US 37,000 was raised by Charls Walker and former Texas Governor John B. Connally over coffee. By the CPDs November launch, the CPD had received $US 79,608.

368 See (CPD), Committee on the Present Danger. "Is America Becoming Number 2? Current Trends in the U.S.-Soviet Military Balance (October 5, 1978)." Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger. Ed. Charles Tyroller II. Washington: Pergammon , 1984. pp39-94

369 See CPD "Where We Stand on SALT (July 6, 1977) in Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger. Ed. Charles Tyroller II. Washington: Pergammon Brassey's, 1984. pp16-22.

370 Caldwell, Dan. The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. p.104.

371 Edward Rowny in an interview with Dan Caldwell, Washington DC June 3, 1987, cited in Caldwell, Dan. "The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate." Washington D.C.: International Studies Association 31st Annual Convention April 10-14, 1990. p.3.

372 Eugene Rostow in an interview with Dan Caldwell, Washington DC, October 27, 1988, cited in Caldwell, Dan. "The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate." Washington D.C.: International Studies Association 31st Annual Convention April 10-14, 1990. p.3.

373 Ibid. p.104.

374 This group was specifically established as a lobby group, unlike the CPD. Its targeting of the mass public included the production and release of a series of short films (Only the Strong, The Price of Peace and Freedom (1978) and The SALT Syndrome (1979)) According to Caldwell Only the Strong was televised more than 800 times and The SALT Syndrome was televised more than 600 times in 1979 alone. See: Kurkowski, David Carl. The Role of Interest Groups in the Domestic Debate on SALT II. Temple University, 1982. pp.137-139, cited in Caldwell, Dan. The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. p.105.

375 Having spent $US1m opposing the ratification of the Panama Canal treaties, they turned their attention to SALT II, producing a thirty-minute anti-SALT film that, according to Dan Caldwell was shown on more than 200 television stations across the United States.

376 The Coalition for Peace through Strength was formed in August 1978 as an umbrella organisation to oversee and coordinate the activities of like-minded groups and individuals concerned with US defence policy and especially SALT II. This, according to Caldwell Op Cit., 1991, p.105-6., arose out of the previous experiences of conservative groups during the Carter administration, that had opposed both Paul Warnke's appointment to ACDA, and the ratification of the Panama Treaties. They had learned that they could be more effective if their activities were coordinated.

377 Charles Kupperman, a professional staff member of the CPD, cited in Caldwell, Dan. The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. p.105.

378 This is also condensed into the title. For a useful textual analysis of this policy statement, see Dalby, Simon. Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics. London: Pinter Publishers, 1990. especially chapter 2.

379 See "Common Sense and The Common Danger" in Tyroler, Charles II, ed. Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger. Washington: Pergamon Brassey's, 1984. p.3.

380 August 1976.

381 Herken, Gregg. Counsels of War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. p.281.

382 Quoted in Herken, Gregg. Counsels of War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. p. 281.

383 See (CPD), Committee on the Present Danger. "Common Sense and the Common Danger (November 11, 1976)." Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger. Ed. Charles Tyroler II. Washington, New York, Oxford: Pergamon, Brassey's, 1984. p.3. This paper was drawn to my attention by Simon Dalby (Simon Fraser University, BC) in a personal communication, February, 1991.

384 "Common Sense and Common Danger" in Tyroler, Op Cit. p.3

385 Ibid.

386 Ibid.

387 Ibid.

388 Ibid.

389 Ibid.

390 Ibid.

391 Ibid.

392 Dalby, Simon. Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics. London: Pinter Publishers, 1990.p.48

393 Dalby Op Cit . p.50.

394 For further reading on texts of persuasion see: Barthes, Roland. "Myth Today." Mythologies. Ed. Roland Barthes. St. Albans: Paladin, 1973. 109-159. Kress, Gunther. "Discourses, Texts, Readers and the Pro-Nuclear Arguments." Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today. Ed. Paul Chilton. London: Pinter, 1985. And Williamson, Judith. Decoding Advertisements: Ideology and Meaning in Advertising. Ideas in Progress. London, New York: Marion Boyars, 1983.

395 Denotation is, for Roland Barthes, the first order of signification. It refers to the simple or literal relationship of a sign to its referent. It assumes that this relationship is objective and value-free, whereas Connotative represents the second order of signification. It occurs when the denotative meaning of the sign is made to stand for the value-system of the culture or the person using it. It thus produces meaning by association, locating attitudinal or evaluative shades of meaning. See O'Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders and Fiske. Key Concepts in Communication. London: Methuen, 1983. p.215-216 and Barthes, Roland. "Myth Today." Mythologies. Ed. Roland Barthes. St. Albans: Paladin, 1973. 109-159.

396 For a clear exposition of this topic see Barthes, Roland. Elements of Semiology. New York: Hill and Wang, 1983 (1967). pp.90-94 and especially pp.91-2

397 Talbot, Strobe. Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II. New York: Harper and Row, 1979. p.56.

398Ibid.

399 Caldwell, Dan. The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. p.106.

400 For an extended exposition of the role of the Committee on the Present Danger, in galvanising the conservative 'hawkish' lobby, see Simon Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics London: Pinter 1990.

401 Ibid. And see (CPD), Committee on the Present Danger. "Does the Official Case for the SALT II Treaty Hold Up Under Analysis? (January 29, 1979)." (CPD) "Is America Becoming Number 2? Current Trends in the U.S.-Soviet Military Balance (October 5, 1978)." (CPD), "Public Attitudes on SALT II (March 15, 1979)." (CPD), "What is the Soviet Union Up To? (April 4, 1977)." (CPD), "Where We Stand on SALT (July 6, 1977)." and Richard Pipes "Why the Soviet Union Wants SALT II" in Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger Ed. Charles Tyroler II. Washington: Pergammon Brassey's, 1979. See also individual contributions to the tirade against SALT II as, for example: Kane, Francis X. "Safeguards from SALT: US Technological Strategy in an Era of Arms Control." The Fateful Ends and Shades of SALT. Ed. Paul Nitze, et al. New York: Crane, Russak & Co, 1979. 37-89, Nitze, Paul H. "The Merits and Demerits of a SALT II Agreement." Ibid.. pp.90-132. Nitze, Paul. "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente (1976)." Paul Nitze on National Security and Arms Control. Ed. Kenneth W. Thompson Steven L. Rearden. Lanham: University Press of America, 1990. 181-209., Nitze, Paul. "Considerations Bearing on the Merits of the SALT II Agreements As Signed at Vienna (1979)." Ibid. 219-240. Nitze, Paul. "What To Do About SALT ? (1976)." Ibid. pp. 211-217. Perle, Richard. "SALT II: Who is Deceiving Whom?" Intelligence Policy and National Security. Ed. Pfaltzgraff et al. Hamden: Archon Books, 1981.

402 Halliday, Fred. "The Sources of the New Cold War." States and Societies. Ed. David Held. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.

403 Bell, Coral. President Carter and Foreign Policy: The Costs of Virtue? Canberra Studies in World Affairs. Canberra: The Australian National University, 1980. p.38.

404 ACDA, US, ed. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations. Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1980. p.202.

405 Ibid. p.203.

406 Campbell, David. Security and Identity in United States Foreign Policy: A Reading of the Carter Administration. Australian National University, 1989. And see also Rosati, Jerel A. The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community. Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1987. p.39

407 Melvin Laird "A Strong Start in a Difficult Decade: Defence Policy in the Nixon-Ford Years." International Security 10.2 (1985): 5-26.p.5.

384 MacKenzie, Donald. "The Soviet Union and Strategic Missile Guidance." International Security (1988): 5-54.

409 With the fall of the Shah of Iran, the US lost a major intelligence monitoring post that would have contributed to verification of the SALT II treaty. Although the loss was not critical, the issue was given considerable debate in Congress, and was yet another contributing factor to the loss of confidence in the treaty expressed in its imminent failure to be ratified at the time it was withdrawn from Senate. See: Blacker, Coit D. "The Soviets and Arms Control: The SALT II Negotiations, November 1972-March 1976." The Other Side of the Table: The Soviet approach to Arms Control. Ed. Michael Mandelbaum. New York, London: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990. Caldwell, Dan. "Verification and SALT." Verification and SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception. Ed. William C. Potter. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980. Humphrey, Senator Gordon J. "Analysis and Compliance Enforcement in SALT Verification." International Security Review 5.1 (1980): 1-26. Talbot, Strobe. Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II. New York: Harper and Row, 1979.

410 Caldwell, Dan. The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. p.187.

411 Cited in Ibid. p.187.

412 Barnet, Richard J. Real Security: Restoring American Power in a Dangerous Decade. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981. p.62.

413 See particularly Article XVII, Paragraph 1, which states:

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972.

414 For a detailed discussion of this see for example: Mackenzie, Donald. Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance. Cambridge, Massachussetts: The MIT Press, 1990.

415 Talbot, Strobe. Deadly Gambits. London: Picador, 1984. p.5

416 Ibid.

417 Duffy, Gloria and Vitali A. Loukiantzev. "Arms Limitation and Control: Improving the Institutional Mechanisms for Resolving Compliance Issues." Verification: Monitoring and Disarmament. Ed. Caloger et al. Boulder: Westview, 1991. 7-19. p. 7.

418 Efinger, Manfred. "The Verification Policy of the Soviet Union." Aussenpolitik. 4.iv (1989): 322-348. p.339.

419 see Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988. p. 31. where she states that among the categories of non-compliant behaviour raised by Reagan were "cases in which Soviet behaviour has improved after a period of questionable compliance; charges retained by the Reagan administration despite a burden of evidence to the contrary; charges based upon a worst-case interpretation of soviet behaviour that differs little from US behaviour; and relatively minor disputes over treaty interpretation in which the US bases a charge of Soviet noncompliance upon its a own unilateral treaty interpretation, without seeking a new common understanding with the Soviets through the SCC."

420 Talbot, Strobe. Deadly Gambits. London: Picador, 1984. p.3.

421 Quoted in: Herken, Gregg. Counsels of War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. p.324.

422 Quoted in: Ibid.

423 David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, quoted in Strobe Talbot 1984 Op Cit. p.226

424 Talbot, 1984. Op Cit . p.229.

425 Ibid.

426 US Senate Congressional Record November 23, 1983 p. S 12861.

427 This is the general presumption against unilateral termination. According to Lord NcNair. The Law of Treaties. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. pp. 493-505 - "...no government would decline to accept the principle pacta sunt servanda, and the very fact that Governments find it necessary to spend so much effort in explaining in a particular case that the pactum has ceased to exist, or that the act complained of is not a breach of it, either by reason of an implied term or for some other reason, is the best acknowledgement of that principle. A long series of inter-governmental discussions of this nature can be invoked to show that there is a general presumption against the existence of any right of unilateral termination of a treaty." - p.493.

Among the cases cited by Lord McNair supporting this principle with respect to United States practice, these include the Memorandum by Sir E. Hertslet dated 20 May 1880 on the Proposed Abrogation by the United States of The Clayton - Bulwer Treaty of 1850.

428 Calvo-Goller, N.K., and M.A. Calvo. The SALT Agreements: Content - Application - Verification. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987. p.178.

429 Ibid. p.178, see note 797.

430 Ibid. p.177-8

431 See Scheer, Robert. With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War. Random House,.New York. 1982. especially chapter 6, pp. 66-82.

432 Scheer, Robert.With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War. New York: Random House, 1982. p.71.

433 See Report of US Secretary of Defence Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY1982 Budget, FY1983 Authorization Request and FY 1982-6 Defence Programs January 19, 1981.

434 US Senate. Congressional Record . September 23, 1983. p.S 12840. This article also completely ignores the air and submarine legs of the triad, dwelling instead on throw-weight and megatonnage without regard to the survivability of their basing platforms.

435 Schelling, Thomas "What Went Wrong With Arms Control?" Foreign Affairs. 64.2 (1985-6): 219-233. p.219.

436 Bialer, Serwyn, and Joan Afferica. "Reagan and Russia." Foreign Affairs. 61.2 (1982-3): 249-271. pp.250-251.

437 Bell, Coral. "From Carter to Reagan." Foreign Affairs. 63.3 (1984): 490-510. p.495.

438 Ibid. p.496.

439 Ibid. p.492.

440 Ibid.

441 Ibid. p.510.

442 For an elaboration on a similar point made regarding the NATO alliance see: Klein, Bradley. "How the West Was One: Representational Politics of NATO" ISQ 34/3 September 1990 pp.311-315. p.313.

443 Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.17.

444 Ibid, p.18.

445 Ibid.

446 PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, Washington: US ACDA. 1984, President Reagan's Letter of Transmittal, House Documents No. 98-158 98th Congress.

447 Ibid. p.1.

448 US Government, ACDA, ed. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations. Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1980. p.150

449 See: Buchheim, R.W., and Sydney Graybeal. Briefing on SALT I Compliance. Washington DC: US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1979.

450 ACA, Arms Control Association. "Analysis of the President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements." Arms Control Today 17.3 (April) (1987): 1a-10a. p.9A.

451 US Government, Ronald Reagan. "Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, report transmittal." Presidential Documents 20.4/ January 30,1984 (1984): 73-77. p.6.

452 See John Newhouse The Nuclear Age from Hiroshima to Star Wars London: Michael Joseph p.242

453 Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.64. Duffy notes further, that the new missile could even be the product of a different design bureau.

454 Later named the SS-N-25

455 The February 1984, and February 1985 reports did not specify the manner in which the SS-25 constituted a violation

456 US Government, Department of State. Soviet Noncompliance With Arms control Agreements Special Report No. 136. Bureau of Public Affairs, December, 1985.p.6.

457 ACA, Arms Control Association. "Analysis of the President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements." Arms Control Today 17.3 (April) (1987): 1a-10a.p.8a. Other sources point to Secretary of Defence, Casper Weinberger as claiming that the throw-weight of the SS-25 was nearly twice that of the SS-13. On this point see: Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988.p.65.

458 Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, chief of staff of the Soviet military

459 Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Military quoted in Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.66-7.

460 US Government, Department of State. Soviet Noncompliance With Arms control Agreements Special Report No. 136. Bureau of Public Affairs, 1985. p.6.

461 ACA, Arms Control Association. "Analysis of the President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements." Arms Control Today 17.3 (April) (1987): 1a-10a. p.8a.

462 Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.70.

463 Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.71.

464 For a detailed analysis of the role of increased accuracy in decreasing the yield side of the equation see: Mackenzie, Donald. Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance. Cambridge, Massachussetts: The MIT Press, 1990.

465 Duffy, Op.Cit 1988, p.72.

466 See US Government, Department of State. Soviet Noncompliance With Arms control Agreements Special Report No. 136. Bureau of Public Affairs, 1985. p.3.

467 Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.69.

468 ACA, Arms Control Association. "Analysis of the President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements." Arms Control Today 17.3 (April) (1987): 1a-10a. p.3a.

469 Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.43.

470 US Government, Department of State. Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements Special Report No. 136. Bureau of Public Affairs, 1985. p.32.

471 ACA, Arms Control Association. "Analysis of the President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements." Arms Control Today 17.3 (April) (1987): 1a-10a. p.4a.

472 US Government, Ronald Reagan. Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements. Department of State: House of Representatives, 1986. p.66.

473 ACA, Arms Control Association. "Analysis of the President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements." Arms Control Today. 17.3 (April) (1987): 1a-10a. p.5a.

474 Zimmerman, Peter. "The Thule, Fylingdales, and Krasnoyarsk Radars: Innocents Abroad?" Arms Control Today. 17.2 (March) (1987): 9-11. p.9.

475 See Zimmerman, Peter. "The Thule, Fylingdales, and Krasnoyarsk Radars: Innocents Abroad?" Arms Control Today 17.2 (March) (1987): 9-11 at p.10, and also Mack, Andrew. "Threats to the ABM Treaty." A.C. 9.2 (Sept.) (1988): 99-115. p.101.

476 Although it had been argued earlier that the Soviets implicitly acknowledged a violation by offering to cease work on the Krasnoyarsk radar in the October 1985 round of the SCC if the United States ceased work on their 'upgrade' of the Thule and Fylingdales Moor radars, the Soviets only acknowledged the radar as a violation explicitly when then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Schevardnadze noted in 1989 that "the Krasnoyarsk radar had been built at a location not permitted under ABM and was a technical violation of the treaty." See: Garthoff, Raymond. "Case of the Wandering Radar." Bulletin of Atomic Scientists July/August (1991): 7-9. p.7. In 1991, Garthoff notes, the Soviets agreed to dismantle the radar, thus removing it as an obstacle to further strategic arms negotiations.

477 Newhouse, John. The Nuclear Age: From Hiroshima to Star Wars. London: Michael Joseph, 1989.

478 Richelson, Jeffrey T. "US Space Reconnaissance after the Cold War." paper presented to conference: Australia and Space. 27-29 November 1991. The Australian National University: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. p.7.

479 Ibid.

480 Burrows, William.Deep Black: The Secrets of Space Espionage. London: Bantam Books, 1988. p.223.

481 Burrows, William. Deep Black: The Secrets of Space Espionage. London: Bantam Books, 1988. p.237.

482 Ibid p.238. Other authoritative accounts put the resolution a little lower, at about two feet, either way the resolution would have presented no problem in the identification of the Krasnoyarsk radar, which measured in the hundreds of feet. See Richelson, Jeffrey T. America's Secret Eyes in Space: The US Keyhole Spy Satellite Program. Grand Rapids, London: Harper and Row, 1990. p.361.

483 Other accounts suggest that the Krasnoyarsk radar was discovered after test transmissions had been detected by a 'Jumpseat' Signals Intelligence satellite. This would make some sense, given that, in order to target a 'close-look' mission, the photoreconnaissance satellite needs fairly precise coordinates of where to gather its images. See, for example: Mack, Andrew. "Threats to the ABM Treaty." A.C. 9.2 (Sept.) (1988): 99-115. p.101, n. 6. Mack points out, that this seems to run counter to the report of Downey, Thomas J., Bob Carr, and Jim Moody. "Report from Krasnoyarsk." Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. .November (1987): 11-14. in which these US Congressional visitors to Krasnoyarsk in 1987 reported that they "...saw no no installed antenna elements, computers, or other electronic equipment anywhere. The transmitter had a completed antenna face and extensive plumbing and electrical power wiring (but no electronic cables); the receiver did not." (Downey, et al., 1987 p.13). This does not preclude, however the gathering of site-location test transmissions used to test wave propagation characteristics and other transmissions used to optimise the frequency, pulse-rate, band-width etc. that would optimise the characteristics of the completed radar. Further test transmissions would be used to determine interference patterns set up during the course of electronically steering the several thousand LPAR elements. These tests would have taken place over a number of years dating from the time of site choice, with calibration tests continuing long after the LPAR had been built. That these tests from mobile radar transmitters were not picked up by a US Jumpseat ELINT satellite until mid-1983 is probably due to a combination of the small number of Jumpseat satellites (2 at any one time) and to the practice of conducting such tests during the period when the ELINT satellites are not overhead or within range of the signals. (Source: author's discussion with Desmond Ball, ANU, 26/11/91).

484 Jeffrey Richelson has slightly different figures for this mission. He cites the orbital inclination as 96.45 degrees, with a perigee of 105 miles (169 Kms) and an apogee of 142 miles (228 Kms). This KH-9 remained in orbit for 275 days. See Richelson, Jeffrey T. America's Secret Eyes in Space: The US Keyhole Spy Satellite Program. Grand Rapids, London: Harper and Row, 1990. p.361.

485 Klass, Philip J. "US Scrutinizing New Soviet Radar." Av. Week & S.T. August (1983): 19-20. p.19.

486 ACDA, US, ed. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations. Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1980. p.141.

487 ACDA, US, ed. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations. Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1980. p.144.

488 Downey, Thomas J., Bob Carr, and Jim Moody. "Report from Krasnoyarsk." Bulletin of Atomic Scientists .November (1987): 11-14. when they asked the Soviets to confirm their estimate of 180 megahertz, the Soviet reply was translated as "something like that."

489 Durch, William J. "The Future of the ABM Treaty." London: IISS, 1987. Adelphi Papers 223.p.14.

490 Durch, William J. Op. Cit 1987 p.13.

491 Ibid p.140.

492 US Government, General Advisory Committee of ACDA. A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices Under Arms Control Commitments 1958-1983: A Summary. General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament (GAC), 1984. p.60

493 Klass, Philip J. "US Scrutinizing New Soviet Radar." Av. Week & S.T. .August (1983): 19-20.

494 US Government, ACDA. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1985 Annual Report. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 1985. p.52.

495 Duffy Op Cit. 1988 p.111 cites three SS-18 sites to the southwest of Abalakovo at Uzhur, Aleysk, and Zhangiz, and one SS-11 base to the southwest at Gladkaya, and another to the southeast at Svobodny.

496 Klass, Philip J. "US Scrutinizing New Soviet Radar." Av. Week & S.T. August (1983): 19-20.

497 See Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988.

498 William Durch Op Cit. 1987 p.13.

499 Author's discussion with Simon Dalby

500 Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.149.

501 Garthoff, Raymond. "Case of the Wandering Radar." Bulletin of Atomic Scientists .July/August 1991 (1991): 7-9.

502 According to Garthoff (1991) p.8 this figure would have been closer to 500 million rubles.

503 Map constructed by the author based on information derived from a map in Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.151.

504 Duffy Op. Cit 1988 p.106.

505 See: Bundy, McGeorge et al. "The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control." Foreign Affairs 63.Winter (1984-5): p. 275 cited in Duffy Op Cit 1988 p.110.

506 ACA, Arms Control Association. "Analysis of the President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements." Arms Control Today 17.3 (April) (1987): 1a-10a.p.2a.

507 Ibid.

508 This schema which situates one discursive object in relation to other discursive objects is adapted from that in chapter three of: Foucault, Michel. The Archeology of Knowledge. London: Tavistock, 1977.

509 GAC Op Cit p.62

510 Ibid.

511 US Government, Department of State Hearings. SALT ONE: Compliance, SALT TWO: Verification US Department of State, 1978. (February 21) cited in Graybeal, Sydney, and Michael Krepon. "Making Better Use of the SCC." International Security 10.2, Fall (1985): 183-199. p.187.

512 In his Letter of Transmittal of the report A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices Under Arms Control Commitments: 1958-1983 Reagan stated: "The General Advisory Committee's report to me resulted from a year-long analysis, by this bipartisan and independent body, of Soviet practices with regard to arms control treaties ... Neither the methodology of analysis nor the conclusions reached in this report have been formally reviewed or approved by any agencies of the US Government." [emphasis mine]

513 The CPD board members who were on the GAC were: Chairman William R. Graham, Colin S. Gray, Francis P. Hoeber, Eli S. Jacobs, Charles Burton Marshall, Jaime Oaxaca, John P. Roche, Donald Rumsfeld and Laurence Hirsch Silberman. The three who were not were: Harriet Fast Scott, Roland P. Herbst and Robert B. Hotz.

514 US Government, Congressional Research Service. Fundamentals of Nuclear Arms Control: Treaty Compliance and Nuclear Arms Control. Report to the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the Committee on Foreign Affairs US House of Representatives, 1985. p.18.

515 Graybeal, Sydney, and Michael Krepon. "Making Better Use of the SCC." International Security. 10.2, Fall (1985): 183-199. p.185.

516 Zimmerman, Peter. "The Thule, Fylingdales, and Krasnoyarsk Radars: Innocents Abroad?" Arms Control Today 17.2 (March) (1987): 9-11. p.9.

517 Ibid. p.9.

518 Lt. Gen. Kelly H. Burke, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for research, development and acquisition, in testimony given before the Senate Appropriations Committee on April 18, 1980, cited in Peter Zimmerman, Op Cit. 1987, p.9.

519 See: Porteous, Holly. US Perspectives on Arms Control Verification. Aberystwyth: University College of Wales, Working Paper No 3, May 1988. p.19.

520 Technical specification of the AN/FPS-115 radar derived from: Jane's Radars and Electronic Warfare. London, New York: Jane's Publishing. 1989-90. p.61. and International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The Military Balance. Director Robert O'Neill. London: IISS, 1986.

521 US Government, ACDA, ed. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations. Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1980. p.141.

522 Zimmerman, Peter. "The Thule, Fylingdales, and Krasnoyarsk Radars: Innocents Abroad?" Arms Control Today 17.2 (March) (1987): 9-11. p.10.

523 Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.94.

524 that is to say that it is a matter of interpretation which changes according to the 'screen' through which it is viewed - it is not, therefore, an objective, technical issue.

525 See Dyson, Kenneth. The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an idea and institution. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980. p.1

526 Here I use 'inscribed' rather than 'described' as the latter implies a separation between the events in themselves and the process of ascribing meaning top the events.

527 Kenneth Dyson Op Cit 1980. p.2.

528 Perhaps a more apt metaphor would be 'liminal space' rather than cutting edge, for at this locus, the boundaries are constantly under negotiation, like the wash between high and low tides - the edge is, therefore, fuzzy and often ill-defined. Indeed, the political and ill-defined nature of these boundaries is, I argue, precisely the reason for the existence of negotiating bodies designed to operate these sets of negotiations in order to maintain the integrity of those boundaries. I argue further that, by operating at/across the boundaries, in the space of anarchy between states, that this is the reason for the highly ritualised and formalised sets of behaviours that characterise the negotiation process.

529 Mackenzie, Donald. Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance. Cambridge, Massachussetts: The MIT Press, 1990. p.342.

530 Author's discussion with Desmond Ball 25/11/91.

531 See: Garthoff, Raymond. "Case of the Wandering Radar." Bulletin of Atomic Scientists .July/August 1991: 7-9.

532 they are postmodern weapons because their value is greater as a sign than as a weapon. This does not alter the fact of their destructive potential, merely that the modalities of their use dictate a strategy of war avoidance rather than of war-fighting.

533 Although the SCC represents only a small contribution to the arms control process, its uniqueness is in the indefinite functioning of the ABM Treaty - it will therefore be available for use continuously, while other negotiating fora may come and go.

534 While the ultimate decisionmaking is not separate from the governments that established and that maintain the SCC, the body does have an existence mandated by the ABM Treaty and by norms of international law through the principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda.

535 thereby abdicating the sovereign nation's right to visual privacy for the sake of an international security regime.

536 The point here is that the arms control process is also informed by knowledge producing communities that are outside of the narrow institutional basis of the SALT regime.

537 See Mackenzie, Donald. Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance. Cambridge, Massachussetts: The MIT Press, 1990. p.378.

538 It does this by, and through language as descriptive of action, through interpretation of instructions, presentations at Plenary Sessions, translation and negotiation of meaning of terms and referral back through the Commissioners' chain of command.

539 For an explication of the terms Self and Other, as used in this thesis, see footnote 8. and page 190ff.

540 Belsey, Catherine. Critical Practice London: Methuen New Accents. 1980. p.75.

541 Ibid.

542 US Government, Special Panel on Arms Control and Disarmament of the Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. Review of Arms Control and Disarmament Activities 98th Congress Washington USGPO 1984. p.22.

543 Belsey, Catherine.Critical Practice. London: Methuen, 1980. p.65

544 Ibid

545 Ball, Terence. Transforming Political Discourse: Political Theory and Conceptual History. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988. pp.3-4.

546 Tilley, Christopher. "Michel Foucault: Towards an Archeology of Archeology." Reading Material Culture: Structuralism, Hermeneutics and Post-Structuralism. Ed. Christopher Tilley. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990. p.338.

547 This argument is sustained analogously in Tilley's archeology of Archeology in Tilley, Op. Cit. 1990. p.338ff.

548 Arms Control Today 21:8 October 1991. p.30.

549 Forum discussion with Mr. Jeffrey Jukes, ANU December 13, 1991.

550 ...rather, they are culturally produced linguistic entities. (See Thomas Hobbes' Persona Ficta.)

551 Michel Foucault The History of Sexuality: An Introduction Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1984.p.100.

552 Yosef Lapid "The Third Great Debate in IR" ISQ Spring 1989

553 Max Weber "Politics as a Vocation: Types of Political Authority" The Great Political Theories ed by Michael Curtis NY:Discus Books 1962, p372:

"Like the political institutions historically preceding it, the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate violence" and

Karl von Clausewitz On War Harmondsworth: Penguin books, especially the chapter:"War as an Instrument of Policy" in which Clausewitz states:

"We maintain...that War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means" and that this political intercourse "...does not cease by the War itself, is not changed into something quite different, but that in its essence, it continues to exist, whatever may be the form of the means which it uses, and that the chief lines on which the events of the war progress ... are only the general features of policy... p.402

554 By this I want to suggest that by rendering nuclear weapons as of a different order from conventional weapons and by keeping a wide gap between the two orders, the incentive to cross the gap into actual use in anger might be considerably reduced.

555 See Brodie, Bernard "Implications for military policy" The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order NY: Harcourt, Brace And Company, 1946 p.76

556 See Bernard Brodie (f/n1) p.83

557 See William J. Durch "The Future of the ABM Treaty" Adelphi Papers Number 223, Summer 1987 p.9

558 Quoted in Umberto Eco Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language London:Macmillan, 1985, p.2.

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