APPENDIX A TREATY BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS Signed at Moscow on 26 May 1972 Entered into force on 3 October /972 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind, Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons, Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms, Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament, Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. 2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article 111 of this Treaty. Article II 1. For the purposes of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of: (a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode (b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and (c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode. 2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph I of this Article include those which are: (a) operational; (b) under construction; (c) undergoing testing; (d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or (e) mothballed. Article III Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that: (a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers, and (b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars. Article IV The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges. Article V 1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. 2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers. Article VI To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes: (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and (b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward . Article VII Subject to the Provisions of this Treaty. modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out. Article VIII ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time. Article IX To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty. Article X Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty. Article XI The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. Article XII 1 For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. 2. Each party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph I of this Article. 3. Each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices. Article XIII 1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will: (a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous; (b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed; (c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification; (d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty (e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty; (f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty; (g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms. 2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters. Article XIV 1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty. 2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty. Article XV 1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article XVI 1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification. 2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. APPENDIX B INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (SALT I AGREEMENT) Signed at Moscow on 26 May 1972 Entered into force on 3 October 1972 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, Taking into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Have agreed as follows: Article I The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972. Article II The Parties undertake not to convert land based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time. Article III The Parties undertake to limit submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, and in addition to launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines. Article IV Subject to the provisions of this Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers covered by this Interim Agreement may be undertaken. Article V 1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. 2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph I of this Article. 3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices. Article VI To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established under Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in accordance with the provisions of that Article. Article VII The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations. Article VIII 1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notices of acceptance by each Party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. 2. This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years unless replaced earlier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It is the objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible. 3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Interim Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Interim Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. APPENDIX C MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION Signed at Geneva on 21 December 1972 Entered into force on 21 December 1972 I. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby establish a Standing Consultative Commission. II. The Standing Consultative Commission shall promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty between the USA and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26 1972, the Interim Agreement between the USA and the USSR on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of May 26, 1972, and the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the USA and the USSR of September 30, 1971, and shall exercise its competence in accordance with the provisions of Article XIII of said Treaty, Article VI of said Interim Agreement, and Article 7 of said Agreement on Measures. III. Each Government shall be represented on the Standing Consultative Commission by a Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, assisted by such staff as it deems necessary. IV. The Standing Consultative Commission shall hold periodic sessions on dates mutually agreed by the Commissioners but no less than two times per year. Sessions shall also be convened as soon as possible, following reasonable notice, at the request of either Commissioner. V. The Standing Consultative Commission shall establish and approve Regulations governing procedures and other relevant matters and may amend them as it deems appropriate. VI. The Standing Consultative Commission will meet in Geneva. It may also meet at such other places as may be agreed. APPENDIX D PROTOCOL, WITH REGULATIONS, REGARDING THE US-SOVIET STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON ARMS LIMITATION Signed at Geneva on 30 May 1973 Entered into force on 30 May 1973 PROTOCOL Pursuant to the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission, dated December 21, 1972, the undersigned, having been duly appointed by their respective Governments as Commissioners of said Standing Consultative Commission, hereby establish and approve, in the form attached, Regulations governing procedures and other relevant matters of the Commission, which Regulations shall enter into force upon signature of this Protocol and remain in force until and unless amended by the undersigned or their successors. ATTACHMENT REGULATIONS 1. The Standing Consultative Commission, established by the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972, shall consist of a U.S. component and Soviet component, each of which shall be headed by a Commissioner. 2. The Commissioners shall alternately preside over the meetings. 3. The Commissioners shall, where possible, inform each other in advance of the matters to be submitted for discussion. but may at a meeting submit for discussion any matter within the competence of the Commission. 4. During intervals between sessions of the Commission, each Commissioner may transmit written or oral communications to the other Commissioner concerning matters within the competence of the Commission. 5. Each component of the Commission may invite such advisers and experts as it deems necessary to participate in a meeting. 6. The Commission may establish working groups to consider and prepare specific matters. 7. The results of the discussion of questions at the meetings of the Commission may, if necessary, be entered into records which shall be in two copies, each m the English and the Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. 8. The proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission shall be conducted in private. The Standing Consultative Commission may not make its proceedings public except with the express consent of both Commissioners. 9. Each component of the Commission shall bear the expenses connected with its participation in the Commission. APPENDIX E PROTOCOL ON THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between The United States of America and the Union of Soviet socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. hereinafter referred to as The Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon provisions governing the operation of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, established pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty. I. Composition of the Commission 1. Each Party shall communicate to the other Party the names of its designated Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to the Commission. The Parties shall communicate to each other the names of the initially designated Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to the Commission as soon as practicable, but in any case no later than 30 days after signature of the Treaty. 2. Each Party shall have the right to be represented at a session of the Commission by its Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner as well as by their alternates, and by members, advisers, and experts. A session of the Commission may be convened without the participation of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner. In such a case, any other individual provided for in this paragraph may be the head representative of a Party to a session of the Commission. 3. The head representatives of the Parties shall alternately preside over meetings during a session of the Commission. 4. The Commission shall have the right to constitute working groups consisting of any of the individuals provided for in paragraph 2 of this Section for the consideration of specific questions raised in the Commission. II. Convening a Session of the Commission 1. A session or the Commission shall be convened at the request of either Party. No later than 14 days after receiving Such a request, the requested Party shall submit a response. Requests and responses shall include the following: (a) the questions that the Party intends to raise; (b) the name of the head representative of the Party; and (c) the proposed or accepted date and location for the convening of the session. Each Party may also submit additional questions to the other Party in the period from the submission of the initial response to the initial request until the convening of the session. 2. A session of the Commission shall be convened as soon as possible after receipt of the response provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section. 3. A session of the Commission shall be convened in Geneva, Switzerland, or, as appropriate, in another place agreed by the Parties. 4. The Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of each of the Parties may, without the convening of a session of the Commission, communicate with the Commissioner of the other Party in order to clarify any unclear situations or to resolve questions. III. Convening a Special Session of the Commission 1. A special session of the Commission shall be convened at the request of either Party to address what the requesting Party considers to be an urgent concern relating to compliance of the other Party with the obligations assumed under the Treaty. Such a request shall include, at a minimum, the following: (a) the nature of the concern including the kind and, if applicable, the type of strategic offensive arms related to the concern; (b) the name of the head representative of the Party; and (c) the proposed date and location for the convening of the special session. The requesting Party may also propose in the request a specific method for resolving the concern. Such a method may include, but is not limited to, a visit with special right of access to the facility or location where, in the opinion of the requesting Party, the activity that caused the concern took place. 2. No later than seven days after receiving such a request, the requested Party shall submit a response. Such a response shall include either: (a) acceptance of the proposed date and location for the convening of the special session; or (b) a proposal for an alternate date and location for the convening of the special session. The alternate date shall be no later than ten days after the date proposed by the requesting Party. 3. The response of the requested Party may also include: (a) acceptance of the proposed specific method for resolving the concern, including, if a visit with special right of access is planned, the proposed date, location and procedures for such a visit; or (b) a proposal for a special method for resolving the concern, including, if a visit with special right of access is planned, the proposed date location and procedures for such a visit. If the Parties agree to a visit with special right of access or another method for resolving the concern, the Parties may agree not to convene the special session. Visits with special right of access may be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Inspection Protocol, as applicable. 4, Either Party may request additional information related to the concern. A response to such a request shall be submitted no later than seven days after receipt of the request, but shall not affect the time for convening the special session of the Commission, if such a session is held. 5. A special session of the Commission shall remain in session for no more than 30 days. IV. Agenda l. The agenda for a session of the Commission shall consist of those questions that the Parties have included in the communications provided to each other in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of this Protocol. 2. Each Party shall have the right to raise the Commission questions that arise immediately preceding or during a session of the Commission; provided, however, that consideration of such questions during the current session shall be subject to agreement of the Parties. In case of such agreement, the Parties shall allow sufficient time prior to consideration of such questions for preparation and any changes in the composition of their delegations that are required. 3. Sessions of the Commission shall be convened irrespective of the number of questions on the agenda. V. Work of the Commission work of the Commission shall be confidential except as otherwise agreed by the Commission. The Commission may record agreements or the results of its work in an appropriate document, which shall be done in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. Such documents shall not be confidential, except as otherwise agreed by the Commission. VI. Costs Each Party shall bear the cost of is participation in the work of the Commission. VII. Communications Communications pursuant to this Protocol shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers VIII. Additional Procedures and Provisional Application 1. The Parties shall have the right to agree upon additional procedures governing the operation of the Commission. 2. The provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol shall apply provisionally from the date of signature of the Treaty for a 12-month period. unless. before the expiration of this period: (a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate the provisional application of the provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol; or (b) the Treaty enters into force. The Parties may agree to extend the provisional application for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph. 3. The provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol shall apply provisionally in light of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty. This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that. if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty. Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages both texts being equally authentic FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: GEORGE BUSH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: M. GORBACHEV PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS APPENDIX F THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA DECLASSIFY FIVE AGREEMENTS FROM THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION During recent meetings of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), representatives from the US and Russia agreed on a US proposal, originally made during August 1991, to declassify and release to the public five agreements negotiated in the SCC. Four of the agreements are related to the 1972 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). The fifth document relates to the 1971 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nudear War Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Administration remains committed to its goal of dedassifying agreements such as those listed below and to enhancing the public's general understanding of arms control. LIST OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION WITHIN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION THAT MAY BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC: 1. Protocol on Procedures Governing the Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, For ABM Systems and Their Components (July 3,1974) 2. Supplementary Protocol to the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, For ABM Systems and Their Components of July 3,1974 (October 28,1976), (Including the Integral Agreed Statement Regarding Section III, Paragraph 5) 3. Agreed Statement Regarding Certain Provisions of Articles II, IV, and VI of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26,1972, and the Utilization of Air Defense Radars at the Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of that Treaty (November 1,1978), (Including the Integral Commissioners' Identical Conformed Statements Read at the Signing of the Agreed Statement) 4. Common Understanding Related to Paragraph 2 of Section III of the Agreed Statement of November 1,1978, Regarding Certain Provisions of Articles II, IV and VI of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26,1972, and the Utilization of Air Defense Radars at the Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of that Treaty (June 6, 1985) 5. Common Understanding Related to Articles 2 and 5 of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of September 30,1971 (June 14,1985) (US ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20451 OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS APPENDIX G FIVE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION WITHIN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION NOW DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC LIST OF AGREEMENTS 1. Protocol on Procedures Governing the Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components (July 3,1974) 2. Supplementary Protocol to the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, For ABM Systems and Their Components of July 3,1974 (October 28,1976), (Including the Integral Agreed Statement Regarding Section III, Paragraph 5) 3. Agreed Statement Regarding Certain Provisions of Articles II, IV, and VI of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26,1972, and the Utilization of Air Defense Radars at the Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of that Treaty (November 1,1978), (Including the Integral Commissioners' Identical Conformed Statements Read at the Signing of the Agreed Statement) 4. Common Understanding Related to Paragraph 2 of Section III of the Agreed Statement of November 1,1978, Regarding Certain Provisions of Articles II, IV and VI of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems on May 26,1972, and the Utilization of Air Defense Radars at the Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of that Treaty (June 6,1985) 5. Common Understanding Related to Articles 2 and 5 of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of September 30, 1971 (June 14,1985) PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Agreed Statements regarding that Treaty, the Parties thereto have within the framework of the Consultative Commission agreed upon procedures governing dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for ABM and their components limited by that Treaty, as formulated in Attachment hereto which constitutes an integral part of this Protocol. The Parties have also agreed on the following general guidelines: 1. The attached Procedures shall apply only to systems or their components to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty; 2. Any replacement of ABM systems or their components shall be on the basis of Article VII of the Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; dismantling or destruction of ABM systems or their com- ponents in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified by the Treaty shall be on the basis of Article VIII of the Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; 3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ABM systems or their components, related to implementation of the provisions of Article VII regarding replacement of those systems or their components and Article VIII of the Treaty, shall ensure that those systems or their components and facilities associated with those components, except for facilities at test ranges, would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for ABM purposes; shall ensure that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of those units would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction; and shall preclude unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction; 4. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall be formulated separately for above-ground and silo ABM launchers and for ABM radars; 5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by national technical means in accordance with Article XII of the Treaty; 6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with the attached Procedures, facilities remaining at ABM launch or ABM radar sites may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; and 7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number and type (above-ground or silo) of ABM launchers and of the number of ABM radars on which dismantling destruction has been completed and is in process, and of the number of ABM launchers and ABM radars used for replacement. This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall enter into force upon signature of this Protocol and remain in force for the duration of the Treaty, and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it deems appropriate. DONE at Moscow on July 3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both equally authentic FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: (Signed) Secretary of State FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: (Signed) Minister of Foreign Affairs SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL TO THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS OF JULY 3, 1974 Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Agreed Statements regarding the Treaty, and the Protocol to the Treaty of July 3, 1974, the Parties thereto have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission and in implementation of the provisions of the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components of July 3, 1974, agreed upon procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty, as formulated in the Attachment to this Supplementary Protocol. This Supplementary Protocol and the attached Procedures shall constitute an integral part of the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components of July 3, 1974 and shall be considered the second attachment to that Protocol. The attached Procedures shall enter into force upon signature of this Supplementary Protocol and remain in force for the duration of the Treaty, and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it deems appropriate. Done at Geneva on October 28, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. Sydney N Graybeal (Signed) (Signed) COMMISSIONER, COMMISSIONER, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS I. General 1. These Procedures shall constitute an integral part of the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components of July 3, 1974, and shall be considered the second attachment to that Protocol. The Procedures shall apply to ABM systems or their components, when they are being replaced within a deployment area on the basis of Article VII of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, as well as when a deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged on the basis of the Protocol to the Treaty of July 3, 1974. 2. Replacement of an ABM system or its components within a deployment area or exchange of a deployment area of an ABM system or its components shall be carried out so that components of an ABM system, as defined in Article II of the Treaty, in their total number and composition, shall be consistent with the provisions of Article III of the Treaty. 3. When an ABM system or its components are being replaced within a deployment area or when a deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged, for each type of component being deployed or replaced an event, verifiable by national technical means, shall be identified which indicates the initiation of its deployment or the initiation of its dismantling or destruction. After such an event, a component correspondingly shall be included in the number specified by the Treaty and Protocol thereto for such components or shall be excluded therefrom. 4. Within a deployment area of an ABM system or its components replacement of an ABM system shall be carried out by replacing its components. Dismantling or destruction of components being replaced and deployment of replacement components of an ABM system shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Sections II and III of these Procedures. 5. If a replacement component of an ABM system is deployed at the location of the ABM system component being replaced, so that dismantling or destruction of the latter is a necessary part of the construction or installation of the replacement component, the manner and extent of dismantling or destruction of the component being replaced shall be at the discretion of the Party carrying out the replacement. Removal and replacement of ABM interceptor missiles shall be carried out at the discretion of the Party carrying out such replacement, subject to compliance with the provision of Article III of the Treaty. 6. Exchange of a deployment area of an ABM system or its components shall be carried out through coordinated activities with respect to the dismantling or destruction of the ABM system or its components in the area being exchanged and with respect to the deployment of the ABM system or its components in the replacement area pursuant to the provisions of the Protocol to the Treaty and Section IV of these Procedures. 7. Notification of the replacement of components of an ABM system, both within a deployment area and when the deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged, shall be given twice annually in the Standing Consultative Commission at the beginning of regular SCC sessions, reflecting the actual status as of the beginning of that session and covering the period since the last notification in the Commission. In this connection, the Party carrying out the replacement shall notify the other Party of the number and type (above-ground or silo) of ABM launchers, of the number and type (large phased-array ABM radars or ABM radars with a potential less than three million) of ABM radars, and of the number of ABM radar complexes, on which dismantling or destruction has been completed and is in process, and of the number of ABM launchers, ABM radars and ABM radar complexes which have been replaced. 8. Notification of the exchange of the deployment area of an ABM system or its components shall be given in the Standing Consultative Commission pursuant to Article II of the Protocol to the Treaty. Such notification shall be given before initiation within the replacement area of any construction activities associated with the exchange of the deployment area of an ABM system or its components and shall contain the time of initiation of these activities as well as the location of the new deployment area (the direction and distance to the new area in relation to the center of the area being exchanged). Upon completion of dismantling or destruction of the ABM system or its components in the area being exchanged, the Party which has carried out the exchange of the deployment area of the ABM system or its components shall notify the other Party of having carried out the exchange of the area, at the next regular session of the Standing Consultative Commission. 9. Each Party may on a voluntary basis add other information to the notifications if it considers such information necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed under the Treaty. II. Procedures for ABM Launchers 1. Subject to compliance with the limitations provided for in the Treaty and the Protocol thereto, ABM launchers may be replaced by above-ground or silo ABM launchers within a deployment area as well as when the deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged. 2. With respect to replacement of ABM launchers within a deployment area of an ABM system or its components, as well as when the deployment area is being exchanged: (a) The beginning of any construction or assembly work, other than earthwork (excavation), associated with the building of replacement ABM launchers (above-ground and silo) shall constitute initiation of deployment of these launchers, after which they shall be subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty. (b) Removal from the launch site of all above-ground launcher elements, and in addition, for a silo launcher, dismantling or destruction and removal from the launch site of the silo door or cover and dismantling or destruction of the headworks shall constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of ABM launchers (above-ground and silo) being replaced, after which they shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty. (c) Prior to initiation of dismantling or destruction of ABM launchers (above-ground and silo) being replaced, all ABM interceptor missiles associated with them, as well as the warheads for these interceptor missiles, shall be removed from the launch site. 3. When carrying out dismantling or destruction of ABM launchers being replaced, the following actions shall be accomplished: (a) Above-ground launchers and associated equipment shall be removed from the launch sites and the entire part of the launch pad containing the launcher mount and reinforcements snall be dismantled or destroyed. (b) Above-ground structures and headworks of ABM silo launchers shall be dismantled or destroyed; dismantled or destroyed silo doors or covers, as well as equipment associated with these launchers, shall be removed from the launch sites. The silo shall be destroyed by dismantling or destroying its concrete elements to a depth of at least five meters from the upper edge of the headworks. The silo shaft shall remain open for at least six months. 4. Deployment of replacement ABM launchers within the deployment area of an ABM system or its components shall be initiated no earlier than initiation of dismantling or destruction of the ABM launchers being replaced in that area. 5. Dismantling or destruction of ABM launchers being replaced shall be completed no later than three months after initiation thereof as defined in subparagraph 2(b) of this Section of the Procedures. Debris remaining after dismantling or destruction of ABM launchers ( above-ground and silo) may be removed, and after six months the former ABM launcher locations may be covered with earth. III. Procedures for ABM Radars and ABM Radar Complexes 1. Subject to compliance with the limitations provided for in the Treaty and the Protocol thereto, ABM radars and ABM radar complexes may be replaced within a deployment area, as well as when the deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged. ABM Radars 2. With respect to replacement of ABM radars within a deployment area of an ABM system or its components, as well as when the deployment area is being exchanged: (a) The beginning of any construction or assembly work associated with the building of antennas (arrays), ABM radar antenna structures, or antenna pedestal supports which are not parts of ABM radar buildings shall constitute initiation of deployment of replacement ABM radars, after which they shall be subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty. (b) Removal or destruction of antenna protective covers, dismantling or destruction of antennas (arrays) and antenna structures, as well as opening of those parts of ABM radar buildings in which antennas (arrays) had been mounted, shall constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of ABM radars being replaced, after which they shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty. When carrying out dismantling or destruction of ABM radars being replaced, the following actions shall be accomplished: (a) ABM radar instruments and equipment shall be dismantled and removed from the radar site. (b) Antenna protective covers shall be dismantled or destroyed. (c) ABM radar antennas (arrays) with their structures or with antenna pedestal supports which are not parts of ABM radar buildings as well as the pads occupied by the bases and reinforcements of such supports shall be dismantled or destroyed. The dismantled elements shall be removed from the ABM radar sites. (d) Those parts of ABM radar buildings in which antennas (arrays) had been mounted as integral parts thereof shall be opened and destroyed in such a manner that there will remain no more than half of the perimeter of the opening formed as a result of opening that part of the building where antennas (arrays) had been mounted. The buildings shall remain in such a condition for six months, after which they nay be restored but not beyond that level to which destruction is required. (e) Debris remaining after completion of dismantling or destruction of ABM radars may be removed after six months. 4. Deployment of replacement ABM radars within the deployment area of an ABM system or its components shall be initiated no earlier than the initiation of dismantling or destruction of the ABM radars being replaced in that area, and shall be carried out in such a manner that it will not cause the number of ABM radars to exceed the number specified in Article III, subparagraph (b) of the Treaty subject to compliance with the provisions of that subparagraph and the applicable Agreed Statements concerning the potential of radars. 5. Dismantling or destruction of ABM radars being replaced, which are components of the ABM system currently deployed by each Party, shall be completed without unreasonable delays no later than one year after initiation thereof as defined in subparagraph 2(b) of this section of the Procedures. 6. After dismantling or destruction of ABM radars has been completed in accordance with the above procedures, facilities remaining at ABM radar sites may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes which are not inconsissent with the provisions of the Treaty. ABM Radar Complexes 7. With respect to replacement of ABM radar complexes within a deployment area of an ABM system or its components, as well as when the deployment area is being exchanged: (a) The initiation of deployment, as defined in sub- paragraph 2(a) of this Section of the Procedures, of even one ABM radar of an ABM radar complex being deployed shall constitute initiation of deployment of replacement ABM radar complexes, after which they shall be subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty. (b) The initiation of dismantling or destruction, as defined in subparagraph 2(b) of this Section of the Procedures, of all ABM radars of each ABM radar complex being replaced shall constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of ABM radar complexes being replaced, after which they shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty. 8. Deployment of replacement ABM radar complexes within the deployment area of an ABM system or its components shall be initiated no earlier than the initiation of dismantling or destruction of ABM radar complexes being replaced in that area, and shall be carried out in such a manner that it will not cause the number of ABM radar complexes to exceed the number specified in Article III, subparagraph (a) of the Treaty, subject to compliance with the provisions of that subparagraph concerning the size and circular shape of the area of each ABM radar complex. 9. Dismantling or destruction of ABM radar complexes being replaced shall be completed by dismantling of all ABM radars of each ABM radar complex being replaced in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section of the Procedures no later than one year after initiation thereof as defined in subparagraph 7(b) of this Section of the Procedures. IV. Procedures for Exchange of the Deployment Area of an ABM System or its Components 1. When the deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged, no construction activity associated with the deployment of an ABM system or its components in the replacement area shall begin until appropriate notification is given to the other Party pursuant to Article II of the Protocol to the Treaty and Section I, paragraph 8, of these Procedures. 2. When the deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged: (a) Initiation of deployment, as defined in Section II, subparagraph 2(a) of these Procedures, of even one ABM launcher (above-ground or silo) in the replacement area shall be carried out no earlier than completion of the initiation of dismant or destruction, as defined in Section II, subparagraph 2(b) of these Procedures, of all ABM launchers in the area being exchanged. (b) Initiation of deployment, as defined in Section III, subparagraph 2(a) of these Procedures, of even one ABM radar, including one which is part of an ABM radar complex, in the replacement area shall be carried out no earlier than completion of the initiation of dismantling or destruction, as defined in Section III, subparagraph 2(b) of these Procedures, of all ABM radars, including those which are parts of ABM radar complexes, in the area being exchanged. 3. Prior to completion of dismantling or destruction of 50 percent of the number of ABM launchers, ABM radars or ABM radar complexes in the area being exchanged, the Party carrying out the exchange may initiate deployment of no more than 50 percent of the number of ABM launchers, ABM radars or ABM radar complexes which is specified in Article III of the Treaty for the replacement deployment area of an ABM system or its components. 4. Each Party may, at its discretion, completely dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the area being exchanged, and thereafter deploy an ABM system or its components in the other area permitted in Article III of the Treaty and the Protocol thereto, provided that, prior to initiation of construction, notification is given pursuant to Article II of the Protocol to the Treaty and Section I, paragraph 8, of these Procedures. 5. When the deployment area of an ABM system or its components centered on the national capital is being exchanged, those non-phased-array ABM radars which were operational within that area on the date of signature of the Treaty shall be dismantled or destroyed. When carrying out dismantling or destruction of these ABM radars, the following actions shall be accomplished: (a) Antenna protective covers shall be dismantled or destroyed. (b) Antennas, antenna structures and ABM radar equipment shall be dismantled and removed from the radar site. Buildings and facilities remaining after dismantling or destruction of these ABM radars may be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. Dismantling or destruction of these ABM radars shall be completed no later than accomplishment of the other actions provided for in these Procedures for exchange of the deployment area of an ABM system or its components 6. Dismantling or destruction of ABM launchers, ABM radars and ABM radar complexes within the area being exchanged shall be carried out in accordance with Section II, paragraphs 3 and 5, and Section III, paragraphs 3, 5 and 9 of these Procedures. Geneva October 28, 1976 STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION AGREED STATEMENT REGARDING SECTION III, PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS ATTACHED TO THE SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL OF OCTOBER 28, 1976 Agreeing that dismantling or destruction of ABM radars being replaced, which are components of the currently deployed ABM system of each Party, shall be completed without unreasonable delays no later than one year after initiation thereof as defined in Section III, subparagraph 2(b) of these Procedures, the Parties understand that if, in the future, either Party operationally deploys ABM radars of another type as a component of an ABM system, the periods of time for dismantling or destruction of such radars would be subject to agreement in the Standing Consultative Commission, but in any case would not exceed one year. (Initialled) Geneva November 1, 1978 STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION AGREED STATEMENT Regarding Certain Provisions of Articles II, IV, and VI of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Utilization of Air Defense Radars at the Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of that Treaty In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti- Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties thereto have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, reached mutual understanding regarding the following: I Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of the Treaty 1. The test ranges referred to in Article IV of the Treaty are any test ranges at which an ABM system or at least one ABM launcher, regardless of whether or not it contains an ABM interceptor missile, or one ABM radar is located or constructed for purposes of testing. 2. Any other types of weapons or military equipment may also be located at such test ranges for testing according to their mission or for range safety purposes. Such location testing, or use of these other types of weapons or military equipment, provided it is consistent with the provisions of the Treaty, shall not constitute a basis for considering them ABM system components. 3. The current test ranges referred to in Article IV of the Treaty are those test ranges which each Party had on the date of signature of the Treaty, that is, on May 26, 1972. Both the USA and USSR had on May 26, 1972, and have at the present time, two current test ranges: for the USA in the vicinity of White Sands, New Mexico, and on Kwajalein Atoll and for the USSR in the vicinity of Sary Shagan, Kazakhstan, and on the Kamchatka Peninsula. 4. Each Party may establish test ranges referred to in Article IV of the Treaty as "additionally agreed" and locate therein for testing ABM systems or their components as they are defined in Article II of the Treaty, provided that the establishment of such ranges is consistent with the objectives and provisions of the Treaty and, in particular, with the obligations of each Party provided for in Article I of the Treaty not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense. 5. In the event of establishment of an additional test range by either Party, the Party carrying out such action shall provide, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, notification of the location of such a test range no later than thirty days after the beginning of any construction or assembly work, other than earthwork (excavation), associated with locating or constructing at that test range an ABM launcher or antenna (array), ABM radar antenna structures, or an antenna pedestal support which is not a part of an ABM radar building. After presentation of such notification and, if necessary, clarification in the Standing Consultative Commission of any aspects of this notification which are clear to the Party being notified, the test range being newly established will be considered an "additionally agreed test range," referred to in Article IV of the Treaty. The Term "Tested in an ABM Mode" Used in the Treaty The term "tested in an ABM mode," which is in Article II of the Treaty for defining ABM system components, refers to ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, which are tested in an ABM mode separately or in conjunction with other ABM system components after the date of signature of the Treaty, that is after May 26, 1972. The term does not refer to components which were tested by the Parties in an ABM mode prior to that date. 2. Testing in an ABM mode is the testing, which, in accordance with the provisions of Articles III and IV of the Treaty regarding locations of ABM systems or their components, is carried out only at test ranges or in an ABM system deployment area, for the purpose of determining the capabilities of an ABM system or its individual components (ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars) to perform the functions of countering strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. 3. As applied to testing of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, the term "strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory," used in the Treaty, also refers to ballistic target-missiles which, after being launched, are used for testing these ABM system components in an ABM mode, and the flight trajectories of which, over the portions of the flight trajectory involved in such testing, have the characteristics of the flight trajectory of a strategic ballistic missile or its elements. 4. The term "tested in an ABM mode" used in Article II of the Treaty refers to: (a) an ABM interceptor missile if while guided by an ABM radar it has intercepted a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory regardless of whether such intercept was successful or not; or if an ABM interceptor missile has been launched from an ABM launcher and guided by an ABM radar. If ABM interceptor missiles are given the capability to carry out interception without the use of ABM radars as the means of guidance, application of the term "tested in an ABM mode" to ABM interceptor missiles in that event shall be subject to additional discussion and agreement in the Standing Consultative Commission; (b) an ABM launcher if it has been used for launching an ABM interceptor missile; (c) an ABM radar if it has tracked a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory and guided an ABM interceptor missile toward them regardless of whether the intercept was successful or not; or tracked and guided an ABM interceptor missile; or tracked a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory in conjunction with an ABM radar, which is tracking a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory and guiding an ABM interceptor missile toward them or is tracking and guiding an ABM interceptor missile. 5. The provisions of paragraph 4 of this Section shall be applied taking into account Article VI, subparagraph (a), of the Treaty concerning the obligations of the Parties not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM system components, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. The term "tested in an ABM mode" shall not be applied to radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, or to radars, including phased-array radars, used for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or as national technical means of verification. 6. The term "tested in an ABM mode" shall not be applied to radars, including phased-array radars, which are constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment. 7. The term "tested in an ABM mode" shall not be applied to a radar, including a phased-array radar, which is not an ABM radar or a radar referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section, if strategic ballistic missiles or their elements passed through the field of view of the radar while it was operating in accordance with its mission, and it was not, at that time, performing functions inherent only to an ABM radar, and it was not functioning in conjunction with an ABM radar. In the event that ambiguities arise in the future regarding application of the term "tested in an ABM mode" to individual radars which track strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, the Parties, in accordance with Article XIII of the ABM Treaty, will consider such questions in the Standing Consultative Commission and resolve them on a mutually acceptable basis. 8. Deployment of radars of a type tested in an ABM mode, except as provided in Articles III and IV of the Treaty, to carry out any functions would be inconsistent with the obligation of each Party not to provide a base for an ABM defense of the territory of its country. III Utilization of Air Defense Radars at the Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of the Treaty 1. Utilization of air defense radars located at or near a test range to carry out air defense functions, including providing for the safety of that range, is not limited by the provisions of the Treaty and is independent of the testing carried out at that range. 2. When air defense components and ABM system components are colocated at a test range, the Parties, in order to preclude the possibility of ambiguous situations or misunderstandings, will refrain from concurrent testing of such air defense components and ABM system components at that range. 3. In utilizing air defense radars as instrumentation equipment at test ranges the Parties will not use such radars to make measurements on strategic ballistic nissiles or their elements in flight trajectory. STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER BUCHHEIM November 1, 1978 Mr. Commissioner, I would like to make the following Statement regarding the Agreed Statement which we have just initialed. FIRST, in paragraph 6 of Section II of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, the Parties agreed that the term "tested in an ABM mode" shall not be applied to radars, including phased-array radars, which are constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment. With respect to such radars the Parties understand that: (a) phased-array radars which have a potential exceeding three million may be located only at the test ranges referred to in Article IV of the ABM Treaty; (b) phased-array radars which have a potential not exceeding three million and which make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory may be located only at the test ranges referred to in Article IV of the ABM Treaty or at locations to which strategic ballistic missiles are launched for testing; (c) phased-array radars which have a potential not exceeding three million and which do not make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory may be located anywhere for instrumentation or other purposes not inconsistent with the ABM Treaty; (d) non-phased-array radars may be located anywhere for instrumentation or other purposes not inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. SECOND, in connection with paragraph 7 of Section II of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, the Parties understand that ABM radars, radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, radars used for tracking objects in outer space or as national technical means of verification, as well as radars constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment can, when operating in accordance with their missions, perform the function inherent to them of tracking strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. In addition to the aforementioned radars, both Parties have other radars, including phased-array radars, intended for various missions. When these radars are operating in accordance with their missions, strategic ballistic missiles or their elements might procss through the fields of view of these radars. The passing of strategic ballistic missiles or their elements through the fields of view of such radars will not be equated with tracking of such missiles by these radars and cannot give grounds for either Party to consider that in these cases the radars are being tested in an ABM mode. If ambiguities arise in the future regarding application of the term "tested in an ABM mode" to individual radars which track strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, or regarding determination of whether these radars are ABM radars or radars which are not ABM radars, such questions will be subject to consultation in the Standing Consultative Commission in accordance with Article XIII of the ABM Treaty. THIRD, the Parties, in connection with the Agreed Statement Regarding Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty, have the common understanding that the Agreed Statement will be used by the Parties in their implementation of those provisions of the ABM Treaty, beginning on the date of initialing of the Agreed Statement by the U.S. and USSR SCC Commissioners, that is, November 1, 1978. Like the statements in connection with paragraphs II.6 and II.7 of the Agreed Statement, this common understanding constitutes a component part of the general understanding reached between the Parties with regard to certain provisions of the ABM Treaty. Geneva June 6, 1985 STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION COMMON UNDERSTANDING RELATED TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF SECTION III OF THE AGREED STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 1, 1978, REGARDING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES II, IV, AND VI OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITA- TION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS OF MAY 26, 1972, AND THE UTILIZATION OF AIR DEFENSE RADARS AT THE TEST RANGES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE IV OF THAT TREATY In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties thereto, in further development of the agreement recorded in paragraph 2 of Section III of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, with a view to precluding the possibility of ambiguous situations at the test ranges referred to in Article IV of the Treaty, have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, additionally agreed that: each Party will refrain from launching strategic ballistic missiles to the area of such a test range or from launching ABM interceptor missiles at that test range concurrent with the operation of air defense components located at that range; Commissioner Ustinov delivered the same statement on 1 November 1978: in agreeing to the foregoing the Parties recognize the possibility of circumstances - the appearance of a hostile or unidentified aircraft - in which, for the purpose of providing for air defense, a necessity for the operation of air defense components, located at the test range for carrying out air defense functions including providing for range safety may arise unexpectedly during the launch of a strategic ballistic missile to the area of the test range or during the launch of an ABM interceptor missile at that range. Should such an event occur, the Party which had such a concurrent operation will, as soon as possible, but within thirty days, provide notification to the other Party describing the circumstances of the event. It will, if necessary, on a voluntary basis, also inform the other Party about the event or hold consultations with it within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, as provided for in Article XIII of the Treaty and paragraph 4 of the Regulations of the Standing Consultative Commission. This Common Understanding constitutes a component part of the agreement reached between the Parties with regard to the provisions of paragraph 2 of Section III of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, and does not affect other provisions of that Agreed Statement or the provisions of the common understandings thereto reached by Commissioners in the Standing Consultative Commission on November 1, 1978. The provisions of this Common Understanding will be used by the Parties in their implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, beginning on the date of signature of this Common Understanding that is, June 6, 1985. (Signed) (Signed) Commissioner, Commissioner, United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Geneva June 14, 1985 STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION COMMON UNDERSTANDING RELATED TO ARTICLES 2 AND 5 OF THE AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1971 The Parties, in accordance with Article 7 of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of September 30, 1971, hereinafter referred to as the Agreement on Measures, and Paragraph II of the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972, have agreed as follows: The Parties understand that the phrase "unexplained nuclear incidents", found in Article 5 of the Agreement on Measures, includes the acquisition by any means, including by theft or fabrication, threat to use, or detonation of a nuclear explosive device by unknown or unauthorized individuals or groups. Furthermore, the Parties understand that the phrase "an accidental, unauthorized or any other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon which could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war", found in Article 2 of the same Agreement, includes any such incident which is caused by unknown or unauthorized individuals or groups and which involves a nuclear weapon of a Party. This Common Understanding will be used by the Parties in implementing the provisions of the Agreement on Measures beginning on the date of signature of this Common Understanding, that is, June 14, 1985. (Signed) (Signed) Commissioner, Commissioner, United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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